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ABSTRACT
Malaya's Indian Tamil Labor Diaspora: Colonial Subversion of 
Their Quest for Agency and Modernity (1945-1948) 
by
Patricia Spencer, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2013
Major Professor: Dr. Edward Glatfelter
Department: History 
Malaya's Indian Tamil diaspora owed its presence in the country to the British who 
needed access to cheap labor for large scale agricultural projects. The most lucrative of these 
projects were the rubber plantations. Economically challenged South Indian peasants from the 
lowest of castes were the industry's mainstay. Their destitution and India's system of social 
stratification were factors that the colonial government took advantage of. Regarded by the 
British colonists and planters alike as malleable, gullible, and easily manageable,  Indian laborers 
were used for  light, monotonous work that required very little skill. Achieving upward mobility 
was an arduous and next to impossible task as the colonists found it profitable to maintain these 
people as an underclass that could be exploited. Perceptions of these people as an inferior lot 
with no political economy dominated the colonial narrative. 
World War II was to change this perception. The veil of British superiority was removed 
from the eyes of these laborers when the British lost to the Japanese.  Upon their return to 
Malaya after the war, the British found a more defiant Indian community. War time conditions 
iv
severely drained Indians of their resources and left them in an impoverished and destitute 
condition. However, British return to Malaya did nothing to alleviate the community's suffering 
as colonial interests were solely to get the stalled rubber industry up and running again. 
Laborers' demands for higher wages and better working conditions were met with 
antagonism and eventually, draconian military suppression. Alliances forged with the Chinese 
labor community were quickly subverted. Indian labor involvement in radical unionism which 
was encouraged by the Malayan Communist Party was taken as an affront to colonial domination 
and was quickly branded as a terror movement. As such, the colonial narrative was able to 
maintain that resistance during this period was a terrorist movement led by communists, instead 
of being a labor movement demanding rights from the British. However,  an alternate narrative 
should also exist in history showing that the colonial narrative was challenged by these Indians 
who had embraced a modern spirit in their defiance towards their colonial masters.
(112 pages)
vPUBLIC ABSTRACT
Malaya's Indian Tamil Labor Diaspora: Colonial Subversion of Their Quest 
for Agency and Modernity (1945-1948)
by Patricia Spencer
The Indian labor diaspora that settled in Malaya, now known as Malaysia, was a diaspora 
that was used to further colonial ambitions. Large scale agricultural projects required a 
workforce that Malaya did not have. South Indian peasants from the untouchable Madrasi caste 
were taken to Malaya, initially, as indentured servants. When indenture was abolished, they were 
engaged as contract workers. Inferiority and backwardness were common colonial perceptions 
that were held against them. These laborers were exploited by the British as they had no 
bargaining power or the ability to demand more than a meager wage.
World War II redefined the way these laborers started to view the British. Having suffered 
defeat in the hands of the Japanese, the colonial power retreated meekly. This was a significant 
development as it removed the veil of British dominance in the eyes of a formerly docile people. 
When the British returned to Malaya after the war, it was a more defiant Indian labor community 
who greeted them. These wanted more concessions. They wanted citizenship, better wages and  
living conditions. They wanted a future that did not retain them on the rubber estates but one 
where they could finally shed their subaltern roots and achieve upward mobility.
This new defiance was met with antagonism by the colonial power whose main concern 
was to get the lucrative but stalled rubber industry up and running again. The destitution and 
impoverishment suffered by the Indians during the war was ignored as they were rounded up like 
cattle to be put to work again on the estates. 
When their demands were not met, Indian laborers joined forces with the heavily 
Communist influenced Chinese migrant community to go on strikes, the strongest weapon they 
had at their disposal. The creation of the All Malayan Rubber Workers' Council, a predominantly 
Indian trade union, is essential in showing how Indian labor became a threat to the British that 
they eventually had to retaliate with draconian military suppression through the imposition of the 
Emergency in 1948.
Archival material from the Malaysian National Archives, The National Archives of the 
United Kingdom, the Labor History and Archive Study Center at the People's History Museum in 
the United Kingdom, and the Hull History Center in the United Kingdom, were analyzed to 
present an alternate narrative as opposed to the colonial narrative, in recognizing and attributing 
a modern spirit and agency amongst this formerly docile labor diaspora. This work presents the 
events of 1945-1948 as a time when Indians rejected the colonial perception of them as an 
inferior people, and challenged the colonial power. However, their efforts were subverted by the 
British and by doing so, the British ensured the maintenance of a labor disapora that would 
continue to be exploited by those who ruled over them.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“We want Indians as indentured labourers, not as free men.”
Sir Thomas Hyslop1
Sociologist Robin Cohen explains that a labor diaspora is one that develops when 
there is “an expansion from a homeland in search for work, in pursuit of trade or to 
further colonial ambitions.”2 The Indian labor community that settled in Malaysia is an 
example of this. Although contact between Indians and Malaya existed since the pre-
Christian era through trade, the mass migration of South Indians to Malaya  and their 
settlement only occurred during colonial rule. Indian laborers were brought by the British 
to work the sugar and coffee plantations, and later, the rubber estates. Their sole purpose 
was to provide labor capital. 
Under colonial rule, Indian Tamils from the untouchable Madrasi class were 
treated as tools of production in the colonial capitalist enterprise.  Given their subaltern 
background, it was easy for the British  to manipulate them. In this thesis I will analyze 
how the British viewed this Indian subaltern background and used its perceived 
backwardness to the colonial power's advantage.  I will also explore the significance of 
World War II in Malaya and its impact on the Indian Tamil laborers. The war was 
meaningful to the Malayan people as it removed the veil of dominance that the British 
held in Malaya as they retreated after the Japanese defeat. When the former colonists 
returned after the war, it was a more defiant Asian community that greeted them. The 
nationalist struggle in India  too, had tremendous influence on the Indian community in 
1 C. Kondapi, Indians Overseas: 1838-1949 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1951),  7.
2 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Seattle: University of Washington Press,  1997), 57. 
2Malaya. This struggle inspired Indian Tamils to resist colonial occupation. After the war, 
Indians no longer appeared docile and understood their importance to the colonial 
agenda. These Indians  demanded more in terms of citizenship and rights, which the 
colonial rulers opposed. 
Many scholars downplay the significance of the resistance put up by the Indian 
labor class through their involvement in trade unionism post-World War II.  This is not 
surprising given that colonial attitudes and subsequent scholarship on the subject of race 
during the colonial period  often emphasized the Chinese migrant community as  more 
shrewd and militant and therefore aggressive in its demands.  Colonial documents 
retained the perception of Indians as “passive and unaggressive” even after the war, 
referring to those involved in acts of resistance as “men of straw” under the direction of 
Chinese militant groups.3 Colonial rule also worked hard at encouraging divisions 
between the different races in Malaya before and after the war. The spirit of unity and co-
operation between Chinese and Indians in the post-war period that actively opposed 
British rule was therefore surprising to the colonial power. I will therefore look closely at 
the issue of race relations between the Indian and Chinese working class in Malaya 
during this time.
The Indian working class  played an important role within the colonial plantation 
economic structure. The plantation economy, especially the lucrative rubber industry, was 
an Indian domain. Without cheap Indian labor, the British would not have been able to 
enjoy a profitable rubber trade. The British needed Indian labor to begin working in the 
stalled rubber industry as soon as the war ended. As such, the colonial power regarded 
3 Memorandum by the Secretary of the State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet, “The Situation in 
Malaya,” 1 July 1948, TNA, CAB/129/28/21, p. 116.
3Indian worker defiance and demand for higher wages after the war as troublesome.
In this thesis I will analyze the workings of a predominantly Indian trade union 
called the All Malayan Rubber Workers Council (AMRWC) and the General Strike that it 
organized on 25 August 1947. I will argue that the creation of this union and the 
organization of the general strike was  a show of Indian agency and a display of a modern 
spirit amongst the Indian labor class. Although its resistance was not revolutionary, it did 
force  the hand of the colonial power to give in to its demands, albeit partially. I will 
show how the growing defiance of the Indians and the alliance they forged with the 
Chinese working class, was perceived as a great threat  by the dominant power that it 
responded in the harshest way possible through the imposition of the Emergency
Colonialism and Indian Migration
The story of colonialism in different parts of the world have been recounted by 
many. Of the  most striking ideological social categories, class and race, appear to have 
driven the imperial agenda in many occasions. Indians brought to Malaya  were of the 
untouchable, or lower Madrasi class. As such, they were viewed and treated in a 
degrading way. Even if they wanted to strip themselves of their subaltern nature, they 
were not allowed to do so. It was imperative that they were maintained as a lower class so 
they could be manipulated and used by the colonial power in ways that profited the 
imperial enterprise. The Indian Tamil community was therefore  unable to become an 
entrepreneurial “mobilized diaspora.”4 
Political scientist John Armstrong defines a mobilized diaspora as an ethnic group 
that lacks “a general status advantage, yet which enjoys many material and cultural 
4 Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 58.
4advantages compared to other groups in the multiethnic polity.”5 A proletarian diaspora 
on the other hand is one that is defined as a diaspora  with “limited communication skills 
and comprises a nearly undifferentiated mass of unskilled labor with little prospect of 
social mobility.”6 Unlike members of a mobilized diaspora, they did not have the 
“linguistic, network, and occupational advantages to modernize and mobilize,” thereby 
making themselves invaluable to the nation state.7 The Indian Tamil diaspora in Malaya 
fits the description of a proletarian diaspora for historian K.S. Sandhu explains that the 
Indian Tamils brought to Malaya were regarded by the colonists as “malleable, [who] 
worked well under supervision, and [were] easily manageable.”8 Their main job was to 
simply perform repetitive tasks that required very little skill. Given their disadvantaged 
position in society, achieving upward mobility was an arduous and next to impossible 
task. 
Cohen asserts that a labor diaspora is transitional for no one wants to live a life of 
a servant forever. I argue however that colonial authorities in Malaya robbed and 
subverted any effort that the marginalized Indian Tamil community asserted after the war 
in order to keep them in their subaltern state. Cohen rightfully recognizes though, that the 
assertion of men and women “working a fair day's work for a fair day's pay,” is largely a 
construction of the bourgeoisie.9  Such work centric aphorisms  benefited colonialism as 
well. Exploiting those who came from under privilege backgrounds and paying them 
meager wages,  in the name of giving them a better life was one of the greatest travesties 
5 John A. Armstrong, “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas,” The American Political Science Review 70, 
no. 2(June 1976): 393-408.
6 Cohen,  Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 58.
7 Ibid.
8 Kernial Singh Sandhu, “The Coming of Indians to Malaysia,” in Indian Communities in Southeast Asia,  
eds. Kernial S. Sandhu and A. Mani (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 152.
9 Cohen,  Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 78.
5to have befallen marginalized communities.  However, following James Scott's argument 
on “public transcripts”and “hidden transcripts,” marginalized communities are quite 
capable of maintaining an appearance of working with the oppressive system, i.e. the 
public transcript, while imagining and at times pursuing ends that attack dominant 
interests, in the hope of securing a better life.10  
This thesis asserts that the Indian Tamil labor diaspora was  not contented with 
their meager position in society, and when they attempted to show  their agency, or tried 
to speak truth to power,  they were subverted.  The community, while maintaining an 
appearance of docility for the colonists and planters, did challenge the power structure in 
the hopes of making their lives better. They therefore challenged the notion that they were 
weak. While numerous strikes and other forms of resistance did not ultimately lead to 
major revolution, they did set the tone on how the dominant power would use the 
community's new found defiant nature as an excuse to ultimately strengthen its own 
oppressive hold on the labor movement through more repressive measures. As Scott says, 
“Domination … can only be sustained by continuous efforts at reinforcement, 
maintenance, and adjustment.”11 Although domination won, an alternative memory of 
these people as being brave, strong, and bold, should also exist in the pages of history.
Colonial Attitudes on Race and Class
 British incursion into Malaya began with the acquisition of Penang, an island off 
the Malayan Peninsular in 1786.  As the demand for natural resources such as spices, 
sugar, coffee, and later 'white gold' or rubber increased in the Western world, foreign 
10 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990), 2-4.
11 Ibid., 45.
6corporations rushed to fund and develop large scale agricultural projects in Malaya. By 
1909, Britain was in firm control over the whole of Malaya. Thousands of hectares of 
Malayan countryside was cleared for agricultural purposes. Unable to find local 
manpower to work these projects and others, the British turned to a true, tried and tested 
labor workforce - the South Indian peasants of the Indian subcontinent.12
South Indian migrants were mainly of the “untouchable or lower Madrasi caste.” 
According to Sandhu, the British considered them the most “satisfactory type of laborer, 
especially for light, simple, repetitive tasks.”13 Unlike the Chinese, who was the other 
migrant community in Malaya at that time, Indians did not demand much in terms of 
wages or working conditions. The Indian laborer settled for very little. Because they were 
less likely to create problems and demand better conditions, they were a preferred lot for 
the European officials and planters, especially where menial work was concerned. 
Colonial presence in India had also pushed the peasant class into further poverty. 
The loss of land and livelihood, forced many peasants to seek alternatives to earning a 
living. Indentured servant hood offered  a viable one, and suited the interests of the 
colonists as well. C.L.R. James, in his research on San Domingo, described a system of 
exploitation that was led by greed and a racial ideology that justified it. Similarly, early 
Indian migration to Malaya was propelled by the need for labor to work sugar cane 
plantations, and other municipal projects. The  British,  recognizing early the division of 
castes in India,  used that to their advantage.  India's repressive system of social 
stratification which divided people into different categories and discriminated between 
them, gave further reason for those classified as 'untouchables' to seek a better livelihood 
12 Sandhu, “The Coming of Indians to Malaysia,”151.
13 Ibid., 152.
7elsewhere, if that option was made available. This colonial landscape was an ideal 
environment for exploitation. In the minds of the planters and officials, these simpletons 
were “highly gullible” individuals, with no sense of “political economy,” and could 
therefore, be persuaded “to go anywhere.” Although indentured laborers were said to be 
bound by contract that limited their duration of employment to a few years or until all the 
expenses incurred for their passage was paid off, planters often found ways to re-
indenture them and retain their labor. The lies and deception characterized as 
“diplomacy” by C.L.R. James, coerced these laborers who either in ignorance or under 
duress signed dubious contracts that bargained away their personal freedom for an 
extended period of time.14  When indenture was abolished in 1910, similar methods of 
coercion continued to be used to recruit cheap labor from India to Malaya. Statistics 
provided by Sandhu points out that between 1786 and 1957, approximately 4.2 million 
Indians entered and left Malaya. Of the 1.2 million that remained in Malaya, many died 
from diseases and malnutrition. By 1957, the year of independence, the Indian population 
numbered only 820, 270 of which 62.1% was local born.15
Indian labor was necessary in maintaining low production costs. Owing to the 
number of unskilled laborers India could produce, it was certainly the new 'milch cow' 
after the abolition of slavery in 1833. The colonial government and the plantation owners 
regarded these laborers as nothing more than mere tools of production.  The rubber 
plantation eventually became the most profitable area for the government officials and 
planters to use Indian labor. When it suited them, legislation was enacted, re-enacted, 
14 C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1963), 155.
15 Sandhu, “The Coming of Indians to Malaysia,” 154.
8amended, or abolished to either reduce or increase the number of laborers that could 
come into Malaya to work on these plantations. Workers lacking collective bargaining 
power were forced by the capitalist plantation system to accept the minimum wage  given 
to them. Historian Michael Stenson wrote that these Indian laborers
... had almost no capacity to desert the European plantations in favor of 
independent pioneering agriculture. They were ideally suited to a form of 
production that had been initiated with slave labor, and which could only 
survive on the basis of one form or another of bonded labor or in 
situations of high population density where there was no alternative.16 
Despite the fact that the rubber industry was the most lucrative money maker for 
the colonial empire, Indian laborers were not able to negotiate for higher wages. 
Although official documentation of exactly how much money the British Empire made 
off the rubber trade is scarce and difficult to locate, some idea can be obtained from 
recently released official documents from the National Archives of the United Kingdom. 
In one Memorandum to the Cabinet in 1951, the Secretary for the Colonies said that 
Malayan rubber and that from other Colonial territories in South-East Asia 
are the Colonial Empire's most important dollar earner, and supplies are 
far more than adequate to meet the needs of the United Kingdom itself.17
An earlier Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the Cabinet in 1948 
concerning the Emergency situation in Malaya gives some indication on the amount of 
revenue generated by Malaya and Singapore through its exports. Colonial authorities 
found the emergency situation frustrating as it negatively affected the maintenance of 
healthy colonial balance sheets. 
16 Michael Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia: the Indian Case (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1980), 17.
17 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet,“Possibilities of 
Increasing the Supply of Colonial Foodstuffs and Raw Materials to the United Kingdom,” 12 Nov. 
1951, TNA, CAB/129/48/14, p.55.
9Until the outbreak of the present wave of crime Malaya was, in fact, the 
most peaceful country in South East Asia and had taken long strides 
towards the re-establishment of stable, prosperous conditions. During 
1947 the total value of the exports of Singapore and Federation together 
was 151 million pounds, of which Dollar exports amounted for 56 million 
pounds. It is by far the most important source of Dollars in the Colonial 
Empire and it would gravely worsen the whole Dollar balance of the 
Sterling Area if there were serious interference with Malayan exports.18 
The Sterling Area consisted of those countries, mainly in the British 
Commonwealth and Empire, whose currencies were linked to the British Pound Sterling. 
Because World War II had weakened the Sterling, US Dollars were needed to help in the 
recovery of the whole Sterling Area for what was called post-war rehabilitation. Dollars 
earned through the sale of Malayan rubber to the United States was therefore essential to 
the British.  Educationist and historian, Muzafar Desmond Tate quotes Sir John Hay, 
chairman of Guthrie, describing Malaya “as the largest dollar factory which we possess,” 
and C. F. Cobbold, a senior British Treasury official, declaring that, “without Malaya, the 
Sterling currency system as we know it would not exist.”19 
According to historians Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh,  members of the 
proletariat known as the hewers of wood and drawers of water  performed “fundamental 
labors of expropriation,” and were necessary components to the success of merchant 
capitalism.20 This was clearly the role of Indian labor in Malaya.  Michael Stenson argues 
that Indian labor was solely used for the benefit of metropolitan capitalism.  He wrote 
that the rise of European capitalist interests was spurred along by 
18 Memorandum by the Secretary of the State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet, “The Situation in 
Malaya,” 1 July 1948, TNA, CAB/129/28/21, p. 116.
19 Muzafar Desmond Tate, The Malaysian Indians: History, Problems and Future (Selangor: Strategic 
Information and Research Development Center, 2008), 92.
20 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the  
Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 42.
10
official policy making, informally through the exclusive metropolitan and 
colonial clubs, more formally through regular consultations in London 
between the Rubber Growers Association, mining interests and the 
Colonial Office, and by representation in Malaya on all relevant official 
councils and boards.21 
The British used the Indian and Chinese migrant races to expropriate the resources 
of Malaya. The sovereignty of Malay rulers was preserved through “elaborate 
ceremonial, lavish pensions and a position in the colonial bureaucracy” which appeased 
them and allowed the colonial power to do as it pleased. Likewise, the Malay peasantry 
was also kept out of the export economy as estate laborers and were encouraged instead 
to work in the rice fields. This was a way of ensuring food supplies for the Chinese and 
Indian labor force while reinforcing “peasant conservatism.”22  While the British on the 
outside looked like they were advancing the Malay position, in reality the colonial 
government  was  merely pacifying the Malay rulers and keeping them satisfied so it 
could ultimately use the Indian and Chinese labor workforce to extract the rich resources 
of Malaya for its own economic benefit.
Sociologist R.K. Jain wrote about the creation of a three tiered class structure on 
the estates - the managerial class made up of the Europeans, the Asian supervisory class 
made up of Malayalees and Ceylonese, and the proletariat Tamil class.23 While the 
European planters disassociated themselves from the Tamil laborers, the Asian 
supervisory class usually had day to day dealings with the Tamil laborers. By virtue of 
their educational attainment, they received better wages and were able to send their 
children to English schools, thereby assuring upward mobility for their future 
21 Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia: the Indian Case, 30.
22 Ibid., 30.
23 Ravindra K. Jain, South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1970).
11
generations. In contrast, the Tamil class received sub-standard education using only the 
Tamil language as a medium of instruction, and that also at an elementary level up to 
Primary Six. Providing a decent education to the children of estate workers was not a 
priority to estate employers, since it would have been costly. The colonial authorities did 
not put pressure on estate employers to provide a satisfactory educational system. It was 
in fact pressure from the Indian Government that introduced the “Labour Code of 1923 
that made it obligatory for rubber planters to provide educational facilities if there were 
ten or more resident children of school going age of six to twelve years.”24  Resentful of 
the obligatory nature of the said law, planters ensured that the education provided was 
minimal and ineffective in ensuring upward mobility for these children. Children of 
rubber tappers and weeders were destined to live as their parents with the only 
improvement being that they could perform the same tasks, marginally better, as was 
observed by  E.T. Thompson. Writing on education in the colonial owned plantations, he 
stated:
The educational policy of the planter class is to insure that the children 
of plantation laborers will remain plantation laborers. If education there 
must be, let it be an education designed to make hewers of wood and 
drawers of water better hewers of wood and drawers of water.25
Another strong labor force that was present in Malaya during this same era was 
the Chinese. Hardworking, with strong cultural connections, and most importantly, 
coming as free men to a foreign land to “seek a fortune,” they earned better wages, were 
feared to an extent by the British, and were respected for their work ethics and resolute 
24 Edgar  T. Thompson, “Comparative Education in Colonial Areas with Special Reference to Plantation 
and Mission Frontiers,” American Journal of Sociology 40, no. 2(May 1943): 710-21, quoted in 
Thangavelu Marimuthu, “The Plantation School as an Agent of Social Reproduction,”in Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, eds. K.S. Sandhu, and A. Mani (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2006), 468.
25 Ibid., 468.
12
mind.  While the Chinese came to Malaya to make a fortune, the South Indian laborer 
came to earn a wage, for this was a better path than his continued miserable existence in 
his homeland. Being defined by a caste system that was forced upon him also made him 
an easily exploitable creature. The British took advantage of this fact by the wage 
structure it implemented on the plantations. Low wages were essential in ensuring high 
profit maximization, and unlike the Chinese who could and would negotiate for a higher 
wage, the South Indian laborer would not.  A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies to the British Cabinet in 1951 described the Chinese community with great 
admiration. 
The Chinese, ... are found in all activities of the country - in rubber and 
tin,  as  common  laborers,  as  agriculturalists,  as  proprietors  of  rubber 
estates (20 per cent of the rubber on smallholdings and 17 per cent of 
that on estates is Chinese owned) and of the mines (40 per cent of the 
production of  tin  is  Chinese owned),  as  merchants,  as  contractors,  as 
shopkeepers  (of  whom they  constitute  much  of  the  greater  part),  as 
bankers and as traders. Every year they gain greater economic strength 
and  increase  their  hold  over  the  wealth  of  the  country  ....  highly 
sophisticated, urbane, shrewd, politically aloof and inscrutable. They are 
mostly absentee landlords with no following in the villages or among the 
mass  of  their  fellow-countrymen  .....   It  is  stimulating  to  argue  or 
negotiate  with  them  but  they  are  generally  politicians  without 
constituencies,  leaders  without  followers,  remote  from  the  problem, 
trimming adroitly, ready sometimes with advice and almost always with 
criticism, but not prepared to lead or even to exhort.26 
In contrast, he had nothing but two lines to say about the Indians.
The Indians, mostly Tamils, provide a good deal of the unskilled labor of 
the country, many tapping rubber and a few working in the dredging or 
hydraulicing of tin.27
This mixture of admiration and fear of the Chinese  that was held by the British 
26 Memorandum by the Secretary of the State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet,  “Malaya,”  21 
December 1951, TNA, CAB/129/48/59, p. 239A. 
27 Ibid., 239A.
13
was  also one of the reasons  the migration of Indian labor into Malaya was encouraged 
by the colonial power. Some scholars have argued that the separation of labor along racial 
lines was a powerful way to play one racial group against the other. To have allowed the 
Chinese greater control over the economy and greater strength in terms of numbers would 
have severely weakened the position of the British in Malaya, and also risked the Malays 
losing their claim over the land. The most significant reason the British played the race 
card remained the maintenance of a low wage structure that ensured profit maximization 
in the colonial plantation economy. Robert N. Jackson, the Deputy Secretary of the 
Ministry of the Interior cites the following statement  in his monograph as an example of 
the “contemporary point of view of Europeans planters” regarding Malaya's migrant 
labor community.
To ensure your independence, work with Javanese and Tamils, and, if you 
have sufficient experience, also with Malays and Chinese; you can then 
always play the one against the other ... In case of a strike, you will never 
be left without labor, and the coolies of one nationality will think twice 
before they make their terms, if they know that you are in a position that 
you can do without them.28
A firm racial ideology was therefore obvious from the way these two migrant 
groups were treated by the colonizer. Historian David Roediger's statement about “beaten 
men from beaten races,” as “deficient individuals, as a class, and as a race, they 
represented the worst failure in the struggle for existence,” could have most certainly 
been used to  refer to the Indian Tamils in place of the Irish, or Greeks, or Southern 
Italians.29 The perception held by the British towards the Indians in Malaya was that they 
28 Selangor Journal 4 (1895):438, quoted in Robert N. Jackson, Immigrant Labor and the Development of  
Malaya (Federation of Malaya: Government Press, 1961), 104.
29 David R. Roediger, Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White (New York: 
Basic Books, 2005), 66.
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were  a deficient people. Applying Edward Said's idea of reading 'contrapuntally' to the 
above description of the races offered by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, an 
attitude belying the Secretary's own prejudice of holding one race in admiration and the 
other in disregard, is evident. 
While the British was successful in using the race card before the war to its 
advantage, this thesis will show that the colonial power found difficulty in trying to 
continue playing the same card after the war. The alliance between the Indians and 
Chinese that was encouraged by The All Malayan Rubber Workers Council proved 
effective in forcing the British to give in to the demands of the working class. The 
migrant races had learned that collective bargaining was possible. A unified front was the 
only way to stand up to the dominant power. Although the concessions on the part of the 
colonial power were minimal, the British worried about  how it would embolden the 
working class and strengthen this new Indian/Chinese alliance. While previously the 
British only had to worry about the  militant nature of the Chinese, now the Indians gave 
them a cause for concern too as they took on a more defiant nature. Indian community 
involvement in radical trade unionism gave these laborers a space to not only voice their 
grievances but also courage to face their colonial oppressors. The Indian/Chinese 
working class unity coupled with this new Indian consciousness was not something the 
colonial capitalist enterprise could afford after the war.
The Impact of Colonialism on the Indian Community
in Modern Day Malaysia
Colonialism deeply impacted the countries that it touched. The legacies of 
15
colonialism lives on in many ways till today in these former colonies such as in the 
classification of people, the division of borders, the set up of government structures, the 
attitudes towards race relations, and others. Independence in Malaya did nothing to uplift 
the state of the Indian Tamil proletariat. The discrimination held towards them carried on 
even after the departure of the British. Lacking proper citizenship papers, many Indians 
continued to live illegally in a country that their forefathers called home. Unable the 
enjoy the vital benefits of citizenship such as education that would have enabled gainful 
employment, many remained stuck in a vicious cycle of poverty and destitution. It is not 
surprising therefore that a large number of Indians have fallen into crime and considers it 
an acceptable way of life. Poverty in itself is a crime and crime is a sore that appears in a 
diseased society when disparity among members of the society pushes those in the 
poorest category to a way of life that's criminal. 
Today Malaysian prisons are filled with Indian men incarcerated for various forms 
of crime. Without their breadwinners, families struggle to survive and continue to lose 
more members to a life of crime, reminiscent of what French lawyer Charles Lucas said, 
that
the same order that send the head of the family to prison reduces each 
day the mother to destitution, the children to abandonment, the whole 
family to vagabondage and begging. It is this way that crime can take 
root.30 
In order to understand the problems facing the Indian community in modern day 
Malaysia, one must consider their history for it is a sad history that is wrought with 
prejudices and discrimination. It is truly a legacy of colonialism that has been passed 
30 Charles Lucas, De la reforme des prisons (Paris: E.Legrand et J. Bergounioux,1836): 64, quoted in 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 
268.
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down. This work draws attention to a time when Indian Tamils fought against the 
perceptions held towards them and tried to take control of their future, by forming 
alliances and  resisting colonial rule. It was a show of agency that was denied by the 
dominant power of that time and subsequently by those who wrote the history of Malaya.
In Chapter 2, the different nationalisms that emerged out of the war period in 
Malaya will be explored. The anti-imperial sentiments felt by the migrant Indian and 
Chinese communities moved them to demand independence from colonial rule as this 
would have meant citizenship, and democratic representation for them.
17
CHAPTER 2
POST-WAR NATIONALISMS
This chapter explores the two different nationalisms that emerged in Malaya after 
World War II. One brand of nationalism united all races in Malaya and was especially 
empowering to the Indian and Chinese migrant communities who wanted full citizenship 
rights in Malaya. The other, was a product of fear amongst the Malay elite who felt that 
their position as “sons of the soil” would be threatened if the migrant races were given 
the same privileges as them. They used this fear to mobilize the Malay peasantry into 
forming a strong Malay nationalism that eventually gained the support of the British as 
well.
World War II was a redefining moment in Malaya. As the Japanese advanced into 
the country, the Malayan people saw for the first time, the weakened state of the British. 
Unable to hold its ground, the imperial power left Malaya with its tail between its legs. It 
armed the Malayan People's Anti Japanese Army (MPAJA) with artillery and 
ammunition, leaving them to defend their own lives, resources (even those of the 
colonists and planters), and the country. By this time too, the Indian and Chinese migrant 
communities had developed a kind of nationalism that propelled them to feel a sense of 
belonging and therefore, a more militant attitude in wanting to defend Malaya. These 
were no longer seasonal workers using the country to earn a living while having their 
patriotism lie elsewhere, but people who were born in Malaya and who had made a 
conscious choice to stay in Malaya. They regarded themselves as Malayan citizens, 
though officially they had not gained that recognition yet. The nationalism and struggle 
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for independence in India were especially inspiring for the Indian laborers. Their own 
general discontent  with low wages and poor living conditions under imperial rule were 
significant factors by themselves to resist imperial domination. 
The Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945 was to liberate the most radical 
groups in Malaya. The predominantly Chinese,  Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army 
(MPAJA) which was formed prior to the war to defend the country, had  also very 
successfully integrated Indians and Malays into the army. By organizing  itself as a multi-
racial army of Malays, Chinese, and Indians, representative of all professions, it showed 
that unity among the races was possible. All that was needed was a common experience 
to unite the different races. The war which was merciless on all of Malaya provided that 
avenue. This army consisted of “20,000 people and [included] 7 regiments.” These 
“fought 282 major battles in which they accounted for 5,000 Japanese.”31 The political 
counterpart of the army, The Malayan People's Anti Japanese Union (MPAJU), organized 
passive resistance in the towns. It was in this that the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 
had tremendous influence. People's Councils or Committees were formed by the MCP 
who worked in conjunction with the MPAJA to prevent widespread sabotage and 
destruction by the Japanese as they were leaving the country. In the crucial days after the 
Japanese surrender and before the arrival of the British Military Administration (BMA), it 
was these Councils and the MPAJA that “maintained peaceful conditions, ran municipal 
affairs and looked after the day to day life of the people.”32 Although the MPAJA and 
31 Information Sheet on Malaya by The National Council for Civil Liberties, May 1946, Papers on 
Communist Party of Malaya including Information on the Malayan Independence Struggle and the 
Malayan National Strike, 1946-1947, CP/CENT/INT/36/08 1946-1947, Labor History Archive and 
Study Center, People's History Museum, Manchester, United Kingdom.
32 Ibid.
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MPAJU were initially organized to combat Japanese imperialism, it was not long before a 
radical nationalism and the spirit of anti-imperialism was directed towards the British, a 
cause  into which a growing number of the Indian and Chinese working class readily 
threw themselves.
 Many of the Indians who had served in the Indian National Army(INA) and the 
Indian Independence League(IIL) during the war, believed in the message of Subhas 
Chandra Bose, an Indian Nationalist leader, that they were to fight British imperialism 
with the help of the Japanese and liberate India. However, they found themselves being 
“allocated defensive positions in support of Japanese imperialism against Allied 
invasion.”  Many of these Indians gave up  the little they had to support Bose's cause. A 
large number were forced to be involved in the construction of the Siam-Burma railway 
that took many lives. In the end, Japanese imperialism  became as oppressive as British 
rule and these Indians found themselves exploited again. Disillusioned and impoverished, 
these Indians were attracted to the MPAJA.33 To them, the exhortation by the MPAJU to 
“demand more rice and better pay” from the colonial power  at the end of the occupation 
was especially appealing.34 
Apart from being disillusioned with Bose's message and methods, these Indians 
also knew that upon the return of the British, they would be punished for their alliance, 
forced or not, with the Japanese. The idea of liberating Malaya from imperialism was an 
exciting and hopeful thought, if it meant liberating themselves as well. Stenson writes 
that given a choice between the two imperialisms, many Indians preferred the British, 
who were “leafleting the country with messages of hope for rebuilding 'a new and better 
33 Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia: the Indian Case, 101.
34 Ibid.
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country' that would be a 'real homeland for all those who live in it.'”35 The true intentions 
of the British were not yet known to Malayans. Although the MPAJA was officially 
disbanded on 1 December, 1945, its members continued to take part in many of the 
radical organizations of that time, namely the MCP, the Malayan Democratic Union, and 
the Malay Nationalist Party.
The  Return of Colonial Rule to Malaya
The British Military Administration (BMA) was given a great welcome upon its 
arrival in Malaya. Its stated intent was to take over administration of the country and 
maintain order before completely handing over to a civil authority. It was soon apparent 
that there was a clash in aims. The BMA wished for a “return to 1939; the Malayans, on 
the other hand, because of their experience of 1941-1945, knew there could be no 
returning to the old Colonial system.”36 Although the British were aware that the 
perceptions in Malaya towards them had changed, they were  undeterred. They were 
confident in their ability to control Malaya once again for as C.L.R. James wrote, “Those 
in power never give way, and admit defeat only to plot and scheme to regain their lost 
power and privilege.”37
The BMA's policy regarding Malaya was apparent in a number of ways. First, 
they offered no compensation to the holders of Japanese currency which was repudiated, 
although “large quantities of pre-1942 currency were recaptured in the Japanese 
35 File 5393, series 203, War Office Records (Public Record Office, London), quoted in Stenson, Class,  
Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia: The Indian Case, 101.
36 Information Sheet on Malaya by The National Council for Civil Liberties, May 1946, Papers on 
Communist Party of Malaya including Information on the Malayan Independence Struggle and the 
Malayan National Strike, 1946-1947. CP/CENT/INT/36/08 1946-1947, Labor History Archive and 
Study Center, People's History Museum, Manchester, United Kingdom.
37 James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, 127.
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controlled banks.” Secondly, ignoring the impoverishment of the Malayan population 
during the war, the BMA did not put into place price controls or rationing for essentials 
such as rice, which led to much of this being sold on black markets at inflated prices, 
leaving  only “...less than 10% of the population getting a minimum subsistence diet.” 
Malaya was also not allowed to import foodstuffs from outside the Sterling Block. Prior 
to the war Malaya imported 60% of its foodstuffs.38 For the Indian laboring class, this 
was especially difficult as their loss of livelihood during the war and their forced 
participation on the Japanese Siam-Burma “death railway” project, had left many 
families without breadwinners and thus, with hardly any food. Yet, they were expected to 
return to the estates to jump start the stalled rubber industry.
One of the earliest tasks of the BMA, instead of stabilizing the country and 
helping the people, was to try and dismantle any sort of unionism that was being 
encouraged. Aware of the MCP's effort in trying to consolidate an Indian/Chinese 
working class, the BMA upheld the 1941 repressive legislation against unions. It made it 
difficult for groups to organize and have meetings, requiring them instead to register 
themselves and obtain permission for meetings to be held.  A typical  BMA proclamation 
stated:
Any person who:-
a) publishes, circulates, or has in his possession with intent to publish 
or circulate any printed or written matter which is in the interests of the 
enemy or which is hostile and detrimental to the British 
Administration, the Forces or any of the United Nations; or
b) utter any speech or words hostile or detrimental to the British Military 
Administration, the Forces or any of the United Nations, 
38 Information Sheet on Malaya by The National Council for Civil Liberties, May 1946, Papers on 
Communist Party of Malaya including Information on the Malayan Independence Struggle and the 
Malayan National Strike, 1946-1947. CP/CENT/INT/36/08 1946-1947, Labor History Archive and 
Study Center, People's History Museum, Manchester, United Kingdom.
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shall on conviction be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding seven years or with fine not exceeding 3,000 dollars or 
with both such imprisonment and fine.39
This was clearly not the democratic approach the Malayan people were waiting 
for. It was obvious that the imperial power imposed these sort of proclamations to 
prevent situations where a consensus of grievances could be reached. These meeting 
places were rife social sites much like the “hush arbors” of the slaves, and any highly 
charged social site is a threat to the powers that be.  As Scott says, “Large, autonomous 
gatherings are threatening to domination because of the license they promote among 
normally disaggregated inferiors.”40 Gatherings like these needed to be prevented at all 
cost. The behavior of the British too is in line with how dominant powers maintain their 
position, through “sustained … efforts at reinforcement, maintenance and adjustment.”41
A Working Class Alliance
Indian laborers who began to see the value in what the MPAJA and by extension 
the MCP, was doing, banded together with the Chinese to form General Labor Unions 
(GLUs).  This involvement in unions was a first for the community. The Chinese working 
class on the other hand, had already established “unions” for themselves long before the 
war through their involvement in triads and secret societies. Belonging to such groups 
gave them protection and afforded them the necessary support when they needed to make 
demands of the British, one of the reasons therefore why they were feared by the British. 
The British recognized that these organizations having “power over life and death over its 
39 Ibid.
40 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, 65
41 Ibid., 45.
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members,” were never to be trifled with.42 The Chinese also belonged to guilds. These 
were probably similar to trade unions and “settled rates of wages, hours of work, holidays 
and terms of apprenticeship, and in addition provided friendly benefits.”43 Akin to the 
European craft guilds in the Middle Ages, these provided apprenticeship for those who 
wanted to learn particular crafts. It was not until the 1920s that organizations specifically 
for employees began to be established. Known as Mutual Benefit Societies, their 
main purpose was social rather than industrial, but whose ulterior or 
secondary motive was the maintenance or improvement of the status  and 
conditions of their members as employees.44 
Chinese trade unions developed from these mutual benefit societies.
Unlike the Chinese, Indians never had associations that they belonged to until 
shortly before the war. These were formed along caste lines or along “a particular 
territorial division of Southern India.” Their “objects were social, educational or 
cultural,” or for “the general improvement of the members.”45 Indian unionism in the 
form of their involvement in the GLUs was therefore a first for the community. The 
intention of the GLUs was to bridge the racial divide among the two migrant 
communities and mobilize labor throughout the country as the awareness of the 
importance of  cheap labor to the British Empire, began to grow. The GLUs thus 
consolidated “a new Chinese/Indian working-class alliance.”46 
To this was added the support of the Malays through links with the Malay 
Nationalist Party (MNP). Though the latter's objectives were not completely in line with 
42Awbery and F.W. Dalley, “Labor and Trade Union Organisation in the Federation of Malaya and 
Singapore,” (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office,1948), DDA/7/7, in Papers of Frederick William 
Dalley,  U/DDA, Hull University Archives, Hull History Center, Hull, United Kingdom. 
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia: the Indian Case, 107.
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the MCP, “there was sufficient common ground in their joint opposition to colonialism to 
provide a basis for continuing, if uneasy, co-operation.”47 Eventually, the major flaw of 
the MCP was to not have included the Malays enough. It should have strengthened the 
alliance between the Chinese/Indian working class with the Malay peasantry. Communal 
separateness ultimately drove a wedge between any sort of mobilization that would have 
effectively included all three races. The Malays, deeply insecure about their position and 
driven by their fear of the Chinese, took on a violent stance against them. Stenson wrote 
that, “violent and often indiscriminate Malay attacks upon the Chinese began in 
November 1945 and continued sporadically on the west coast until June of 1946.”48 
Although the MCP was predominantly Chinese and appeared to the Malays, as a 
Chinese party that did not do much in allaying Malay fears and gaining their trust, the 
role of the British in exacerbating the racial situation through its introduction of a new 
constitution, is often overlooked.  The British had always played the race card in Malaya 
counting on the fact that communal separatism was a difficult hurdle to overcome. 
However, archival evidence reveal that although communal separatism was a hurdle, it 
was not impossible to overcome for there were times when all three communities worked 
together with a common purpose. Documents archived at the People's History Museum in 
the United Kingdom about post-war Malaya reveal that the British was constantly 
working to subvert alliances and provoke tensions, that ultimately succeeded in dis-
empowering the people. The final thrust in achieving communal separatism between the 
Malays and the former migrant communities came with the introduction of the British 
proposed Malayan Union constitution. The Malayan Union constitution had all the 
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 108.
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appearances of fulfilling the former migrant races desire of becoming Malayan citizens. 
Although it fell short of truly bestowing all the benefits of citizenship on the Chinese and 
Indians, it was considered enough of an affront to the Malays for them to vehemently 
oppose it. The Malays, already feeling alienated by the Chinese and insecure about their 
own position took this constitution as an attack on their sovereignty. This then led to a 
strong Malay nationalism that forced the British to swiftly abandon the Malayan Union in 
order to propose another constitution that heavily favored  and upheld the position of the 
Malays. As a result, the Chinese and Indian working class found their interests abandoned 
and were left to fend for themselves.
The Malayan Union Constitution and the Federal Constitution
The Malayan Union constitution warrants a little more discussion in this section 
as the Indian and Chinese migrant communities had placed much hope in it when it  was 
first introduced by the British on 10 October 1945.  The Chinese and Indians expected 
this new constitution to grant them citizenship and all the benefits that went with it. On 
the part of the imperial power though, this proposal was an attempt to centralize and 
consolidate the governing of the country. This proposal decided that the Malay States and 
the Settlements of Penang and Malacca would be absorbed into the Union, and be 
administered as a British Colony. The Chinese and Indian migrant population would then 
be eligible for citizenship under this new constitution.  The official statement of policy in 
January 1946 explained that the pre-war style of administration, while effective for that 
time, was no longer appropriate. The colonial power made its intent clear in 1946 in its 
policy statement that
26
 .... the increasing complexity of modern administrative, economic 
and social developments demand a system of government less 
cumbersome, more adequate for large common services, and making 
better use of time and labor.49 
The British wanted a system of administration that cut through bureaucratic red 
tape and eliminated the need for involvement by local authorities i.e. Malay rulers. This 
system would be solely administered by the British at their discretion. This emphasis on 
efficiency was with the immediate needs of capitalism in mind, and the dependence of 
capitalism on a strong migrant labor force who wanted a stake in the country.  As Stenson 
noted, 
The wartime planners finally accepted the political consequences of a 
capitalist economic structure which was absolutely dependent upon (or 
so the British believed) the retention of a large stable Chinese and Indian 
labor force.50
The planners of the Malayan Union were so focused on getting the machinery of 
capitalism going again that they underestimated the resistance of the Malay Sultans to the 
whole scheme. That the Sultans who had enjoyed special privileges all this time were not 
about to transfer their sovereignty to the British Crown, overnight, was somehow a 
matter that was prematurely overlooked.  Furthermore, the influence of the Sultans on the 
Malay peasantry was also imprudently dismissed. The general attitude of the British was 
one of insensitivity and arrogance. This can be seen in a Memorandum written by the 
Secretary of the State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet on 4 October, 1945,  prior to 
the introduction of the Malayan Union where he appears adamant about the British 
49 Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on Future Constitution (Singapore: Department of 
Publicity and Printing of the British Military Administration, 1946), quoted in Stenson, Class, Race and 
Colonialism in West Malaysia: the Indian Case, 108.
50 Michael R. Stenson, “The Malayan Union and the Historians,” Journal of Southeast Asian History 10, 
no. 2 (1969): 345, 344-354.
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position. He said,
We cannot allow ourselves to be to be deterred by an obstinate 
attitude on the part of any or all of the Malay rulers with whom Sir 
Harold MacMichael will have to deal in his forthcoming mission ..... 
His Majesty's Government should now affirm their intention to carry 
through in spite of obstruction on the part of any particular Malay 
Ruler, the policy which they have approved..... All our plans for the 
Malay States depend upon the success of Sir Harold MacMichael's 
efforts to secure jurisdiction in each and all of the States. It is 
essential that his hand should be strengthened by the firm assurance 
that he can, if necessary, make it clear to any recalcitrant Sultan that 
we intend to carry our policy through.51
The imperial policy of playing the race game was apparent once again  in the 
introduction of this new constitution. The British recognized that the  migrant 
community, especially the Chinese who were now largely “communist,” had the same 
goal “which corresponds in very many respects with our own [British] policy.”52  The 
new constitution was therefore a way to appease the migrant community and cajole them 
back to their respective estates and plantations by dangling the opportunity for citizenship 
in front of them. However, the British underestimated the reaction of the Malay sultanate 
to this new plan. 
Feeling threatened about losing their own position of power and not necessarily 
the rights of the Malay peasantry, the Sultans led by Dato Onn bin Jaafar, united to 
oppose the Malayan Union.  It is interesting to note here the role of Dato Onn bin Jaafar 
as a friend of the British. Used to playing the race card, the British ensured that its 
position was always secure no matter which way the decision went. In the event that the 
Malayan Union failed, the British had to make sure that it was aligned with the Malay 
51 Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Colonies to the British Cabinet, “Policy Regarding 
Malaya,” 4 October, 1945, TNA, CAB/129/2, p.1. 
52 Ibid., 2.
28
elite. The British had always enjoyed a special relationship with the Malay elite of the 
country. In order to have exploited Malaya's resources, the colonial power paid tributes 
and pensions to the Malay sultanate to appease them. Therefore, when the sultanate rose 
in opposition to the Malayan Union, it was fairly easy for the British to abandon the 
Union and fall in line once again with the Malay elite because of this past relationship. 
By promising the Malay elite special privileges, the British were able to gain their 
confidence and support. A manuscript written by an unknown author archived at the 
People's History Museum  states that Dato Onn was propped up as a seeming national 
hero among the Malays. It further stated that the British authorities extended Dato Onn 
every possible co-operation while
 .... giving him the necessary facilities for extensive political 
activities. The slogan 'Malaya for the Malays' is encouraged by 
Dato Onn to distract the Malay masses from the truly democratic 
path towards national liberation and democracy, and to prevent 
them from realizing the urgent necessity to unite with the Chinese 
and Indians in order to achieve liberation.53  
His influence was significant as he was able to mobilize the Malay peasantry to 
hold protests all over the country. The mobilization of the Malay peasantry was a death 
blow to whatever hopes of a multi-racial alliance that any group may have had. The final 
act of defiance was the boycott of the inauguration of the new constitution by the rulers 
on 1 April 1946.54
From the outside, the Malayan Union appeared to have had all the right elements 
for the successful building of a pluralistic nation. It appeared as if the imperial power 
53 “Policy after the Restoration of Civil Government,” Papers on Communist Party of Malaya including 
Information on the Malayan Independence Struggle and the Malayan National Strike, 1946-1947. 
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truly had the interests of the people in its heart. The same memorandum quotes the 
Secretary saying that  now was  the time “to fulfill our duty towards Malaya and its 
people.” He affirmed that the destiny of the country was that “of eventual self-
government within the British Commonwealth, a destiny to which all of the inhabitants 
of Malaya can contribute.” It appeared from this memorandum as if the migrant races 
were now true citizens of Malaya, and as such would enjoy all the benefits of that 
citizenship. The Secretary asserted, 
The essential rights of the Malays must be safeguarded, but 
henceforth each of the races forming the population of Malaya must 
have full opportunity of helping build the country's future, of 
developing and enjoying on a basis of common effort and common 
opportunity the great material wealth of the Peninsular, and of 
reaping the benefit of their efforts, provided they in fact regarded 
Malaya as an object of loyalty. They must be citizens of Malaya, with 
all the rights and obligations which that term implies. No one must 
rely on past privilege, or regard Malaya simply as a source of 
material wealth. While it is to the advantage of all the world, and not 
only Malaya, that the production of her mineral and agricultural 
resources should be restored and developed by industry and research, 
it is right that the Malayan people should be assured of their share in 
the rewards of their industry and should be able to feel the country's 
wealth reflected in their own fuller standard of life.55
However, the true intent of the British was to appease the Chinese and Indians for 
its own  purposes. By ignoring the need for diplomacy with the Sultans, the colonial 
power ensured the swift demise of the Malayan Union. At the first sign of trouble, the 
British, afraid of the connections that could be made with the militant Indonesian 
independence movement, abandoned the Union to begin negotiations solely with the 
Malays. J. de V. Allen, the most quoted researcher on the subject, asserted that the Union 
55 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet, “Policy Regarding 
Malaya,” 4 October, 1945, TNA, CAB/129/2, p. 5.
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failed because it did not receive the support of the Chinese and Indians.56 He argued that 
they looked upon it with apathy because their true allegiances lay outside Malaya, i.e. in 
China and India. Michael Stenson corrected this argument and suggests that if Allen had 
read the Indian and Chinese newspapers at that time, he would have come to a very 
different conclusion. The conclusion by the Chinese press was that while the proposal 
seemed to address citizenship equality, it did not do enough to touch on the essence of the 
matter. The essence was “democratic representation.”57
The same could be applied to the Indian presses who “consistently called for 
fully representative politics based upon a universal franchise and leading to 
independence.”58 The argument was that had Allen taken the time to really study how 
the migrant communities felt about their place in Malaya, he would have concluded that 
these were people whom, by this time, had truly invested themselves in Malaya. 
Instead, by placing emphasis on what he thought was their lack of loyalty, Allen failed 
to recognize “the changing nature of Chinese and Indian involvement in Malaya” and 
their retention in Malaya as being crucial to the British economic enterprise.59 
The Malayan Union proposition therefore failed not just because the Malays 
opposed it but because it “neglected to satisfy the aspirations and arouse the enthusiasm 
of the very groups to which it was most designed to appeal.”60 But, the colonial power 
was prepared for either eventuality.
When considering the failure of the Union, an important analysis that has been 
56 J. de V. Allen, The Malayan Union (New Haven: Yale University, 1967).
57 Victor Purcell, “A Malayan Union: The Proposed New Constitution,”Pacific Affairs, XIX, no. 1, March 
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overlooked is the role of the British in setting the tone on how racial dynamics would 
eventually be played out. The British, concerned only with its own immediate economic 
interests, either purposely blinded themselves or  failed to see that by abandoning the 
Malayan Union so quickly and completely siding with the Malays, they were in fact 
creating a potentially problematic future situation. A situation that in a plural society 
such as Malaya, would be difficult to overcome, especially for the minority and weakest 
among the races, the Indian Tamils. Because of their history of marginalization, the 
perceptions held against them as being weak and having a retarded consciousness, their 
own communal divisions, and the sheer fact that unlike the Chinese, they did not have 
the strength in numbers, it was a grave error. Worse still, it was an irresponsible and 
malicious act on the part of the colonial power to  have abandoned what could have 
possibly been something better for the Indians. If the Malayan Union Constitution had 
been written or reworked with the intent of preparing Malayans of all races for true self-
governance and independence, for equal citizenship, and for betterment of the Malayan 
people as a whole, it would have had a very different response. However, it was written 
with selfish motives and as such was never going to  receive the support of the people.
In February 1948,  The Federation of Malaya Constitution  replaced the 
Malayan Union. It was a product of secret negotiations solely between the British and 
the Malays.  This time, the unity that was shown by the Malays under the United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO) banner in their opposition to the Malayan 
Union, was replicated by the Chinese and Indians who “.. on the constitutional issue 
demonstrated an impressive measure of unity during the whole of 1947.”61 That year 
61 Ibid., 351.
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was rife with opposition from the Chinese and Indians who were responsible for 
organizing rallies and demonstrations, which culminated in a widespread work stoppage 
in October.  A countrywide general strike or “hartal” was organized on October 20, 
1947 in protest of this undemocratic constitution, leading to a complete business 
stoppage throughout the country, as well as closure of schools for a day. This 
subsequently led to many more work stoppages throughout the country at different 
times.  An article from an unknown source archived at the People's History Museum 
states: 
The unanimous stoppage in October, was held in the face of government 
intimidation, the Governor of the Malayan Union having threatened 
forfeiture of pay and disciplinary action against government servants 
participating.62 
While organizing themselves to protest, the Indian and Chinese communities also 
struggled with their own distractions, that unbeknownst to them were being 
manipulated by the colonial authorities towards their own ends. 
The visit of Jawarhalal Nehru in March 1946 was a major distraction for the 
Indian community. Nehru, while struck by the way that Indian labor had been organized 
under the GLUs, was cautious in his praise, as the Indian National Congress had only 
recently expelled the Indian Communist Party. With his nationalist approach of 'India 
first for Indians,' it is probable that he would have encouraged that Indian labor be 
extricated from Communist influence.  An article written by an unknown source 
archived at the Labour History Archive and Study Center in the People's History 
62 “Malaya: Growth of the National Liberation Movement of 1945,” Papers on Communist Party of 
Malaya including Information on the Malayan Independence Struggle and the Malayan National Strike, 
1946-1947. CP/CENT/INT/36/08 1946-1947, Labor History Archive and Study Center, People's History 
Museum, Manchester, United Kingdom.
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Museum, states that
the hospitality extended to Nehru by Louis Mountbatten when the former 
was touring Malaya was only meant to deceive the Malayan Indians...... 
Some of the Congress political mongers are attempting to organize a 
single Pan-Malayan organization of the Indians. By this they are trying to 
disrupt the Pan-Malayan General Trade Union in which the Malayan 
organized workers of respective nationalities have united together.63
This was an unfortunate stance to have been taken because when India did obtain her 
independence the following year, it was Nehru himself who distanced India from her 
overseas communities, saying,
We have left to the Indians abroad whether they continue to remain 
nationals or to adopt the nationality of whichever country they live in. It 
is entirely for them to decide. If they remain Indian nationals, then all 
they can claim abroad is favorable alien treatment. If they adopt the 
nationality of the country they live in, they should associate themselves 
as closely as possible with the interest of the people of the country they 
have adopted and never […] become an exploiting agency there. 
(emphasis added)64
Obviously, Indian nationalism was not beneficial for the Malayan Indians who 
were living in a pluralistic situation. It should have only served its purpose as a point of 
inspiration.  With leadership that constantly turned to India for advice, it created 
suspicion among the Chinese and Malays who began to doubt  their allegiance and that of 
the community as a whole. With the obstacles the Indians had before them, it would have 
served them better if they had been part of a strong local racially united front.
The Chinese on the other hand had to contend with the negative publicity they 
were getting from the  involvement of some amongst them in the Kuomintang. The same 
63 “Policy after the Restoration of Civil Government,” Papers on Communist Party of Malaya including 
Information on the Malayan Independence Struggle and the Malayan National Strike, 1946-1947. 
CP/CENT/INT/36/08 1946-1947, Labor History Archive and Study Center, People's History Museum, 
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64 Bakirathi Mani and Latha Varadarajan, “The Largest Gathering of the Global Indian Indian Family: 
Neoliberalism, Nationalism, and Diaspora at Pravasi Bharatiya Divas,” Diaspora: A Journal of  
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34
article from the Labour History Archive and Study Center in the People's History 
Museum stated:
Among the Chinese, the authorities are making use of the reactionary 
Kuomintang clique to disrupt unity by slandering the Communist Party 
with every means in their hands. Being adequately financed, the 
Kuomintang is rather active among the upper and medium strata of the 
Chinese community. Although such activities of the Kuomintang still 
does not constitute as a serious menace to the democratic movement, but 
positive measure are adopted to nip it at the bud.65 
The MCP could have had greater influence on the outcome of the situation, if it 
had not been busy with the reorganization of its party. It would have understood the real 
significance of the secret negotiations that were taking place between the British and the 
Malay rulers. When it did, however, it moved quickly 
.. and succeeded by means of the Malayan Democratic Union in forming 
in December 1946 an at least nominally multiracial alliance in the shape 
of the All Malay Council of Joint Action (later the AMCJA-PUTERA) to 
demand both the retention of liberal citizenship provisions and the rapid 
introduction of democratic, representative politics.66 
Although there were acknowledged weaknesses with this coalition because of the many 
uneasy compromises, this was still a better alternative than the Federation of Malaya 
Constitution. It was, in some sense, the true essence of democracy. The combined 
number of people in this front was 
estimated to include some 600,000. It represented the majority of the 
Malayan people, but was nevertheless completely ignored during the 
government's pretense of 'consulting' the people about the proposed 
constitutional change.67
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The MCP, although itself not part of the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition, nevertheless had 
tremendous influence on the various groups especially the Pan-Malayan Federation of 
Trade Unions. It agreed with the principles that were put forward by the AMCJA namely 
that of “responsible self-government through a fully-elected Central Legislature” for the 
whole country, and “equal citizenship rights for all who make Malaya their permanent 
home and the object of their undivided loyalty.” 68
By this time though, the British were no longer interested in being 
accommodating in any way. The colonial power took great strides in pointing out 
“differing objectives of the various groups comprising the AMCJA-PUTERA  [while 
neglecting to look at the commonalities between them].” This was also the colonial 
power's opportunity to “label the agitation with the communist smear.”69  By doing so the 
British effectively killed  the hopes of the various groups under the AMCJA-PUTERA 
coalition. The branding of the agitation with the smear of communism was an especially 
vicious act  as it gave the authorities a blank check to deal harshly with whatever political 
opposition they regarded as subversive. As Stenson concludes,  
The ideal of a potentially independent multi-racial Malayan nation was 
relegated to the dustbin while the British devoted all their energies to the 
more congenial tasks of economic and administrative rehabilitation.70
In conclusion, the nationalism that emerged out of this and continued to grow in 
Malaya was one that created inequalities in Malayan citizenship. It formed a hierarchy in 
in which the Malays sat at the very top, and by virtue of their position was thus able to 
enjoy all the benefits of citizenship. The others races could never claim this for 
Museum.
68 Ibid.
69 Stenson, “The Malayan Union and the Historians,” 352.
70 Ibid., 353.
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themselves. Instead of a nationalism that could have emerged out of a sense of 
“fraternity” in resisting colonial rule, what did come into being was a nationalism that 
according to Claudio Lomnitz, distinguished  “full citizens from part citizens or strong 
citizens from weak ones.”71 In the case of the nationalism that arose in Malaya, Lomnitz's 
critique of Benedict Anderson thus holds true, that “nationalism does not form a single 
imaginary community.”72 The British in complicity with the ruling elite class in Malaya 
created a situation of inequality that clearly benefited the Malays over the other races, 
effectively destroying the aspirations of those who wanted a successful plural society 
built on equality.
Chapter 3 will explore the emergence of class consciousness and agency among 
Indian Tamil laborers after the failure of the Malayan Union. Reasons for this class 
consciousness will be looked at. Recognizing their place as a deprived class, these 
laborers united themselves under the banner of radical unionism in order to resist 
colonial oppression and voice their demands for better pay and working conditions.
71 Claudio Lomnitz, “Nationalism as a Practical System: Benedict Anderson's Theory of Nationalism from 
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America, ed. Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando Lopez-A lves (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001), 337.
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CHAPTER 3
CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
AGENCY AMONG INDIAN LABORERS
With the introduction of the new constitution, the working class continued to 
exercise its demands through its participation in trade unions. Disappointed with the 
political outcome, Indian Tamil laborers turned to radical unionism. Their demands and 
hopes for democratic representation were directly tied to their working and living 
conditions. When the possibility of true democratic representation was thrown out the 
window, these Indians had no other choice but to voice their demands through the 
unions with the hopes of improving their lives.
 Historian Amarjit Kaur  argues that “worker action and organization … took 
different forms and proceeded unevenly.” With the eventual creation of the National 
Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW),   any sort of labor militancy was quashed as 
union leaders “imposed constraints upon the activities of the workers and their greater 
social status over the laborers impaired worker unity.”  As a result, she concluded that 
there was “no real alliance of class and probably not much class consciousness in the 
rubber plantation industry in Malaya.”73 While she is right in that the creation of the 
NUPW advocated conservative trade unionism and was in line with the imperial 
agenda, she is wrong to assume that there was no class consciousness or class alliance 
in the rubber plantation industry. 
Documents from the Labor History Archive and Study Center in the People's 
73 Amarjit Kaur, “Tappers and Weeders: South Indian Plantation Workers in Peninsular Malaysia,” South 
Asia XXI, Special Issue (1998): 96.
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History Museum reveal the opposite. While issues with sub-communal separatism was 
always present, for the working class who also represented the largest group among the 
Indians, namely the Tamil laborers, the same problems met them day after day. Their 
labor was being exploited on the estates and plantations. Their wages were constantly 
subject to the commodities market and their livelihoods were always under threat by 
other labor groups that could be employed at any time to keep them in line. Regardless 
of the leadership problems within the community,  labor had only one concern – making 
their lives better, and to that end they fought. These Indians were exploited because 
they were unable to shed their subaltern roots. They desired opportunities for 
themselves and their children but were prevented by the British who wanted to maintain 
them as an exploitable class. 
Although the failure of leadership in the Indian community was what led 
scholars like Stenson, Kaur, and  Ramasamy to conclude that there was no class alliance 
or class consciousness among Indians, I argue that this did not mean that class alliance 
and class consciousness was absent among the laborers. The Tamil laborers, always 
suffered the same fate.  They did not need leadership to tell them what their problems 
were. They experienced it first hand. Poverty and hardship were difficult circumstances 
that they encountered daily.  These difficult circumstances created in them a 
consciousness that they as a community were being intentional left in the backwaters by 
colonial authorities and planters simply because they carried the baggage of subalternity 
and could therefore be exploited by which ever dominant power that ruled over them. 
The only way to overcome this pronouncement of inferiority was to resist colonial 
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oppression.  Only through resistance could a positive outcome be obtained for the 
community as a whole.
Conditions Under which Indian Laborers Worked
What were some of these oppressive conditions that Indian laborers struggled 
with? An excerpt from the British newspaper, The Observer, gives us an idea:
Several times I have been shown with pride coolie lines on plantations 
that a kennelman in England would not tolerate for his hounds. There is 
little or no personal relationship between employer and employee, and a 
profound contempt (by the employers) for the trade union movement.... 
One continually hears counter-violence being advocated: 'It's all these 
beggars understand.' There is little consciousness of the poverty and 
illiteracy that exists in the country. And, too often it is a foul, degrading, 
urine-tainted poverty, a thing of old grey rags and scraps of rice, made 
tolerable only by the sun.74
Intolerable conditions such as that described above and the impoverishment suffered 
during the war empowered workers to demand more for themselves from the colonial 
power.
Indian workers were also bonded to the estates unlike the Chinese workers. As 
such, managers when calculating wages took into account the “free” housing that was 
given to these workers.  In the event that the workers participated in strikes, they could be 
easily dismissed and as a direct consequence of that, evicted. Amarjit Kaur's study on the 
wage structure used on the estates reveal a policy of playing one race against another. She 
quotes Palmer who wrote that
in prosperous times Chinese laborers' wages usually ranged well above 
Indian and Javanese workers' wages. Planters justified this wage 
74 “What the Malayan Trade Unionists Are Up Against,” Papers on Communist Party of Malaya including 
Information on Malayan Independence Struggle and the Malayan National Strike, 1946-1947. 
CP/CENT/INT/36/08 1946-1947, Labor History Archive and Study Center, People's History Museum, 
Manchester, United Kingdom.
40
differential on the grounds that the Chinese were healthier and more 
hardworking than the Indians and employment through contractors 
meant that the planters could save on housing and other facilities.75 
After the war, the size of the Malay population was recognized as another way to use race 
for the purpose of  quashing demands for higher wages and the breaking of strikes.   This 
discovery was, according to Stenson, another way of obtaining cheap labor without 
having to improve on production methods.76 The imperial policy of playing one race 
against the other helped in preventing collective bargaining and further ensured that 
division along racial lines would stifle any sort of political unity that may occur, or so the 
Colonial power thought. Although racial divisions and communal separatism triumphed 
many times over  racial unity, it should be noted that it only succeeded because the 
colonial power constantly played its divide and rule trump card to create and maintain 
division. 
The value of Indian labor was also tied to the value of rubber. In his early critique 
of capitalism, Marx spoke about the alienation of the human being from the product of 
his labor. He said, “Labor becomes the slave of the object, since only through it can the 
laborer continue to exist, not only as a worker, but as a human being.”77 Marx's 
observation is clearly seen in Peter Winn's study of the Yarur factory workers in Chile. 
The highly repressive Taylor System that was employed at the factory, mechanized 
workers in their tasks. The system was set up in such a way that profit was its ultimate 
75 Norman Parmer, Colonial Policy  and Administration: A History of Labor in the Rubber Plantation  
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aim. It completely ignored the welfare of the workers and saw workers as nothing more 
than an extension to the machines they were using to create the products. As such, it was 
justified to pay the lowest wages possible while demanding the highest output from 
workers, the management knowing fully well that the survival of the workers depended 
on that wage, no matter how small. For every worker that protested and quit, there were 
many others to replace him or her. The Taylor System was thus, “a capitalist dream but 
workers' nightmare.”78 Contrasting the Taylor System with what the plantation  system 
was like, one obtains a somewhat similar scenario. The fluctuating price of rubber 
controlled the wages of Indian laborers. It even controlled their ability to be employed as 
colonial planters easily dismissed laborers when the demand for rubber was down.
Despite the horrid conditions under which the Yarur workers were employed, they 
were still able to escape their work environment when they clocked out. They had a life 
outside the factory walls that gave them freedom and fulfillment. The Indian plantation 
laborers could not escape their work environment. They were bonded to the plantation. 
To desert, or strike, or simply quit, was to lose the roof over one's head. Not only does the 
laborer suffer the consequence of eviction, but his whole family as well. Workers also 
constantly felt that they were under surveillance as “the bulk of the workers and their 
bosses work(ed) and live(d) in the same environment.”79 Scholar Selvakumaran 
Ramachandran described life on a typical rubber estate as being “highly disciplined” and 
the  daily work, “monotonous, repetitive and routine.”80 There was no escape from the 
78 Peter Winn, Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 45.
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feeling of drudgery and being weighed down. These conditions instilled in them a type of 
discipline that Foucault observed as being necessary for the creation of docile bodies. He 
claimed that, “The aim is to derive the maximum advantages and to neutralize the 
inconveniences (thefts, interruptions of work, disturbances and 'cabals'), as the forces of 
production become more concentrated; to protect materials and tools and to master the 
labor force.”81
The level of surveillance became even more pronounced during the time of radical 
unionism when Indian laborers were heavily influenced by the MCP. Stenson wrote that 
laborers activities were carefully monitored by plantation managers who searched 
laborers in the day to ensure that “they took no extra food to the field that might be 
handed to the Communists.” Laborers were also “effectively locked in their lines” by 
night to prevent them from meeting with anyone connected to the MCP.82 Control over 
Indian laborers freedom was imperative in ensuring that the daily work on the rubber 
plantation was carried out without any subversion. 
Poor wages was the number one concern for Indian laborers. Because their wages 
were tied to the demand for rubber, the Indian working class was unable to depend on a 
steady income. Labor regulations prior to the war allowed for labor to be repatriated 
during down times and increased during peak times. During the years of depression 
between 1930 – 1933, “labor surplus was shipped back to India under the aegis of the 
Tamil Immigration Fund,” thus avoiding labor unrest and reducing planters overheads.83 
The costs of labor reproductions was thus borne by the South Indian villages. As Jomo 
81    Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,142.
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Kwame Sundram noted, it was “subsistence peasant production which actually subsidized 
the necessary costs of reproduction of labor required by capitalists.”84 After the war, labor 
could not be repatriated so the colonial authorities had to ensure that wages were kept at a 
minimum.
Amarjit Kaur, in her study of the plantation wage structure wrote that there were 
three principal methods of payments – check-roll, task, and result. Wages were decided 
not just based on job classification, but also along race and gender lines, resulting in the 
Indians always getting the shorter end of the stick. Such divisions naturally contributed to 
tensions between the Indians and Chinese. Planters justified the wage differential by 
explaining that the Chinese were healthier and therefore better workers. Also, because 
they eliminated planters' overheads by working under contractors who took care of their 
housing and food.  She explained that
The check-roll laborer was paid a fixed daily wage, providing a whole 
day's work was completed. Under the task method of payment the worker 
was assigned a certain amount of work (by law... no more than nine 
hours) and paid according to the number of tasks completed …. In the 
category payment by result, the tapper was also given a task but was paid 
at so much per pound of dry rubber contained in the latex obtained from 
the task. Generally, although Indians and Chinese worked on similar 
tasks, the Indians were employed under the check-roll system, whether as 
tappers or field workers. The Chinese were usually remunerated on the 
payment by result method.85
This wage structure ensured that Indian laborers always received less than the Chinese 
workers. Planters were anxious to continue this trend after the war but received much 
opposition from Indians who demanded an increase in wages. More of them also chose to 
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be employed as contract workers in order to receive wages on par with the Chinese. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 4, this new situation was not at all appealing to the colonial 
authorities and planters who were only interested in profit maximization.
Indian Consciousness and Agency
Amarjit Kaur and Michael Stenson have both written that the bonded  and isolated 
nature of the Indian workers on the estates created in them a consciousness that was both 
“subservient and retarded,” which allowed for their exploitation by the British. In 
contrast, the Chinese workers were aware of the value of their labor to the colonial 
plantation structure and the economic implications on their wages. They were aware of 
the lucrative rubber market and when it was doing well on the commodities market. As 
such, they knew when to make demands for higher wages. However, a change in Indian 
consciousness began to show in the late 1930s. Indians understood the crucial role they 
played in the plantation capitalist structure as cheap labor, and wanted to change this 
dynamics of exploitation. This was evident through intermittent strikes prior to the war 
demanding increases in wages and other benefits. An example of this new consciousness 
is seen in the call for Indian labor to unite against colonial capitalists reportedly made by 
R.H. Nathan, a member of the editorial board of the Tamil Nesan, a leading Tamil 
newspaper in Malaya in 1941:
A lot of coolies now understand what is the difference between laborers 
and capitalists. Co-operation is our watchword. The estate proprietors 
and agents will try to break this co-operation. But we cannot allow this to 
interfere with our work. Unity is strength.86
Yet another example is seen in the remarks to Indian laborers by Y.K. Menon, a labor 
86 Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism: the Indian Case, 57.
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activist around the same time who said, “Before we organized this Union you all thought 
that Capitalists were Gods and we were slaves. Now at least 25 percent  of you realize 
that this is not so. We are Indians and slaves to nobody.”87
After the war, similar remarks like those above were echoed by new leaders that 
continued to show an understanding of the colonial exploitation that was going on and 
how Indians figured in the whole labor – colonial capitalist relationship. An example of 
this can be seen in the following statement by Budh Singh, the radical socialist leader of 
the Malayan Indian Congress who had this to say just before the declaration of a State of 
Emergency in June 1948:
.. the Congress is convinced that the root cause of the industrial unrest is 
…  in fact that the production relations between the vested interests and 
the laboring forces is wholly out of keeping with the present economic 
set-up of the country.[The root cause of the unrest] is in the distribution 
of … wealth. Somebody is taking too much leaving an inadequate 
residue for the laboring many.88
Indian laborers were also very familiar with a hierarchical plantation structure that 
placed white planters and fellow English educated Indians above them. In this structure, 
the Tamil laborer saw no opportunity for himself or his family for upward mobility. In 
contrast, his Ceylonese (from Jaffna in Sri Lanka) and Malayalee (from Kerala in India) 
countrymen, obtained supervisory jobs from the British by virtue of their missionary 
school education in India. The British favored them. Their elevated status enabled them 
to ensure that their children obtained better education in English schools, compared to 
Tamil children on the plantation who received mediocre education. E.T. Thompson 
87 J.D. Dalley, Annexure Report F, Selangor Estate Strike File, Colonial Office Records, 11 March 1941, 
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described the power structure on the plantation as “.. having the characteristics of a small 
state with a classification of people into different statuses together with a formal 
definition of the relationship between them.”89
Amarjit Kaur's description of a “retarded consciousness” among the Tamil 
laborers can therefore be attributed to this organization of placing the most marginalized 
of people at the bottom and not giving them any recognition, placing any value, or having 
any expectations of them beyond the menial tasks that they were required to perform. 
However,  in his critique of false consciousness which is similar to Kaur's description of 
'retarded consciousness,' James Scott argued that  history has many examples in which 
subordinate classes have been “at the base  … of revolutionary movements … seeking 
goals well within their understanding of the ruling ideology.” Scott asserted, “Falsely 
conscious subjects are quite capable, it seems of taking revolutionary action.”90
Therefore,  Amarjit Kaur is  wrong to assume that there was no class 
consciousness or class alliance in the rubber plantation industry. The Indian working class 
was conscious of how important they were in the colonial plantation structure and wanted 
change. They refused to be exploited. While they were willing to remain in the confines 
of the plantation structure, they were unwilling to take the meager allowances that the 
British were giving them. They demanded more.
The period after the war was a time of discovery of agency. The war only 
strengthened this new awareness especially since it removed the veil of British 
dominance.  Not much recognition is given to specifically Indian agency during this time 
89 Edgar T. Thompson, The Plantation Cycle and Problems of Typology (Seattle: University of Washington 
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period because of the briefness in its display and the subsequent counter through 
draconian  measures. Colonial intervention in the form of the declaration of the 
Emergency clamped down on the challenge Indian laborers  made against the British. 
Their end pursuit for better wages and a generally better quality of life, was denied. 
Nevertheless it was a significant time. Significant because dominance was threatened and 
the threat came from a usually subservient group of people. The usual order did not 
matter. James Scott says,  
Hidden transcripts can occasionally be openly declared in the face of 
power. When suddenly subservience evaporates and is replaced by 
open defiance we encounter one of those rare and dangerous moments 
in power relations.91
It was therefore involvement in the trade union movement, encouraged by the 
MCP, that gave these people hope and they used the only effective weapon they knew and 
could use against the colonial power. That was the strike weapon. In this way they 
showed their agency. The failure in leadership compounded with the imperial agenda of 
subversion based on a smear campaign of the MCP and trade unionism,  was what 
ultimately drove the movement among the Indian masses aground.
The first step in repressing unionism was to split up the 300,000 strong Pan 
Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU), formerly known as the General Labor 
Unions(GLUs).  Special Trade Union Advisers were sent in to do this and the mode 
applied was to split the unions up along racial lines – Malays, Indians and Chinese. An 
article written by an unknown source from the Labour History Archive and Study 
Center in The People's History Museum stated:
Though the propaganda in this country has maintained that the Unions 
91 Ibid., 6.
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were repressed because they were “not real unions,” and that they were 
“Communist organizations” and that they were guilty of “terrorism” – the 
official Government reason given for the repression on June 13th was that 
the PMFTU was not registered. Under the Malayan law all Trade Unions 
must be registered and they are only legally entitled to do so if they are 
Unions catering for workers of the same race. Unions affiliated to the 
PMFTU duly registered. But the PMFTU, being a Federation, couldn’t 
and didn't – any more than the TUC registered in Britain. For that “crime” 
it was outlawed, its leaders arrested, shot or driven into the jungle.92
Stenson writes that  “by 1949, the number of registered unionists was down to 41, 
305 or about one-fifth the level of 1947.”93 The only unions that eventually survived were 
the colonial sanctioned ones under the auspices of John Brazier, the  Trade Union Adviser 
from Britain, and those approved by the Registrar of Trade Unions in the period before 
June 1948.
Official colonial records downplay the emancipation movement by workers 
through strikes but interestingly it is also official records through its disclosure of the 
difficulties faced by the Colonial power during the Emergency period and the request for 
arms and military support, that also belie the fact that perhaps the movement was not so 
insignificant. The very fact that the “Emergency” was issued to counter the MCP 
influence is an indication by itself that the post-war period was indeed one of major 
resistance and the atmosphere, one of liberation with a willingness of its participants to 
fight for it till the end. While the colonial authorities attributed violence during  this time 
to the actions of the MCP,  labor documents question this assertion. There was a lack of 
consensus between colonial authorities themselves on how much influence the MCP had 
92 “What the Malayan Trade Unionists Are Up Against,” Papers on Communist Party of Malaya including 
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on trade unions. The following is an excerpt from an article written by an unknown 
source from the Labor History and Archive Center at the People's History Museum:
There is no evidence to show any connection between the killings in 
Malaya and the PMFTU. In fact, the Government itself has produced no 
evidence – and never even accused the PMFTU of this crime …. The 
Government can't even make up its mind on this question. Creech Jones 
[The Colonial Secretary], in the House, said that the Communists had taken 
up arms because they failed to gain any support in the Trade Unions. If that 
is so, why were the Trade Unions banned? On the other hand, Malcom 
MacDonald[High Commissioner] says the unions were banned because 
they were dominated by communists.94
Violence was the order of the day once British authorities started clamping down 
on what they termed as subversive activities. More militant MCP members took to arms 
and were responsible for a number of killings of planters and officials. However, British 
forces were equally responsible for deaths of union leaders and workers who continued to 
resist. This was noted by Budh Singh, the Chairman of the Malayan Indian Congress in 
his following remarks before the declaration of the State of Emergency in June 1948:
Congress contends that violence today in the economic field is not from 
the workers side alone. There is a good deal of violence of a subtle and 
corrosive nature from the side of vested interests. Witness the latest piece 
of Federal legislation for trade unions in the country. A deliberate cold-
blooded attempt on the part of the vested interests working in collusion 
with the Government to deny labor the right of a united labor front to 
strengthen the cause of labor. Congress is aware that on the one hand 
workers, in the frenzy of desperation, driven to the furthest wall by the 
force of economic destitution, have resorted to sticks and stones and 
other puny missiles to wreak their anger on those whom they believe are 
the cause of their poverty. Congress is also aware on the other hand the 
vested interests moving in close association with Government are 
indulging in cold-blooded violence disguised under the innocent and 
legal form of bills and ordinances to repress and coerce labor .... 
Government  has therefore decided for itself that a solution can be found 
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in a brutal and merciless exploitation of the police forces in the country, 
aided no doubt by the military to maintain law and order.95
Official documents representing the public transcript have poorly represented the 
struggles of labor in Malaya post-World War II. As the official representation of “truth,” 
the public transcript denies the actors of that time any agency. Instead it presents them 
i.e. the Indian and Chinese working class  as a people influenced by Communists and not 
as a people fighting for their rights against an imperial capitalist domination.   As James 
Scott said: 
The “official transcript” as a social fact presents enormous difficulties for 
the conduct of historical and contemporary research on subordinate 
groups. Short of actual rebellion, the great bulk of public events, and 
hence the great bulk of the archives, is consecrated to the official 
transcript. And on those occasions when subordinate groups do put in an 
appearance, their presence, motives, and behavior are mediated by the 
interpretation of dominant elites. When the  subordinate group is almost 
entirely illiterate the problem is compounded.96
Chapter 4 looks at the colonial mindset upon its return to Malaya after the war. 
The colonial power's intent to get the stalled rubber industry up and running again is 
obvious in the way Indian workers were “rounded up.” The number of strikes that took 
place in 1947 indicate strong working class organization.  The most significant part of the 
next chapter is an analysis of the creation and influence of the AMRWC.
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CHAPTER 4
WORKING CLASS ORGANIZATION THROUGH
STRIKES AND UNIONISM
 World War II severely drained Malayans of their resources. With a food shortage 
after the war, Indian laborers and others in Malaya suffered miserable conditions. 
Colonial interests were of course to regroup as many laborers as possible to work again. 
A report on the labor situation after the war written in 1945 by the Labor Office indicates 
that destitute laborers, particularly Indian Tamils, were found all over the place after the 
departure of the Japanese, more prominently in the larger cities where they would beg for 
money and food. The  report while stating the condition of these people, also stresses the 
immediate needs of the Empire to obtain as many fit laborers as possible:
The last week has been spent in tracing and collecting together in 
various camps as many unemployed and destitute laborers as could be 
found in and around the town. Most of these laborers are under-
nourished and many of them are ill, some being affected with dangerous 
infections and contagious diseases. Priority has, in the circumstance, 
been given to the transfer of all dangerous cases to hospitals in order to 
prevent the outbreak of a serious epidemic in this town [Kuala Lumpur]. 
The next consideration has been the restoration to health of the 
remaining laborers, so that they may be fit to work again as early as 
possible.97
This emphasis to get laborers in working condition comes up again in a situational report 
in October, 1945 from the Labor Department. It states: 
Already, therefore, we have begun to achieve one of the final objects in 
regard to labor – getting the unfit on their feet again and earning. A 
sustained effort has been made to get work started on rubber estates once 
97 Report on Labor Situation in Kuala Lumpur, 25 September, 1945, in Labor Situation in Kuala Lumpur 
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more, but it has been very much like climbing a steep and slippery 
slope.98
The above statement portrays a complete disregard for the workers humanity and is an 
indication of what the colonial mindset was towards these Indian laborers. They were 
nothing more that tools of production. Colonial officials noted the state of destitution of 
Indian laborers in many documents written in 1945 and the general consensus of the day 
was that the Indian Tamils and the Javanese workers from Indonesia were the most sickly 
and unfit of all the races after the war. A Labor Report for 1945 commented that,
 the Chinese seem to have been well able to look after themselves 
and stand on their own feet to-day. There are batches of 
unemployed, but they are not destitute or unfit to anything like 
the extent that the Tamils and Javanese are.99
It was  this recognition of the state of destitution in the Indian laborer that made it 
easier for British planters and officials to agree on lower wages for they knew the 
desperate state of these laborers. They understood quite well that for those destitute 
laborers, earning something was better than earning nothing. They underestimated the 
influence of the unions and the MCP on the laborers. Of greater significance was the 
laborers' own discontent with everything. The combination of these factors eventually led 
Indian laborers to go on strikes, bringing the industries they were involved in to a virtual 
standstill on many occasions.  E.P. Thompson, a foremost historian on the British 
working class, said that no account of labor unrest could be fully understood without 
taking into account “the total life experience, the manifold satisfactions or deprivations, 
98 Labor Department Weekly Situational Report, 7 – 13 October  1945, in Labor Situation in Kuala 
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cultural as well as material, of the people concerned.”100 The period after the war was 
indeed one of deprivation and destitution in Malaya but a state the colonial government 
refused to recognize and address properly, leading the people to revolt using the only 
weapon they had at their disposal, the strike.
1946, 1947, and 1948 were therefore years filled with strikes and protests, more 
often violent that not, from laborers who were trying to recover from war conditions. 
Indian, as well as Chinese laborers felt that they needed to demand highers wages to meet 
the high costs of living and especially staples like rice. The British knew that these 
frustrations were eventually going to boil over. A situational report written to the Chief 
Secretary of the BMA  from the Labor Department in October 1945 states that 
the urgent need at the moment remains, as stated …. the fixation of the 
price of rice at a reasonably low figure. Labor will not continue to work 
much longer under existing wages and prices.101 
Although some among the colonial authorities recognized this, laborers' demands were 
mostly met with antagonism from the majority of the planters and  colonial authorities. 
The Annual Report for the Labor Department in the year 1947 by R.G.D. Houghton, the 
Colonial Labor Secretary, dismisses the workers' grievances as their inability to 
understand the workings of economics. He states:
Most of the commodities produced in Malaya were in acute demand as a 
result of shortages accruing during the war. In addition, wage rates in 
some industries were too low. In other instances, they were 
uneconomically high because the law of supply and demand had been 
allowed to rein at a time of labor shortage and intense demand. 
Adjustment of wage rates in such circumstances is always difficult and it 
was more so in Malaya owing to the inability of the workers or their 
100 Edward P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Vintage Books, 1963), 444.
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trade unions to appreciate that it was not to their ultimate advantage to 
maintain uneconomically high wage rates or to pursue the mirage of 
increased wages for less output.102
This comes in the same year when the Labor Department in a report on Trade 
Unionism in Malaya stated that the European employers in the tin and rubber industries 
had returned to Malaya  after the Japanese Occupation with one thing in mind and that 
was to “assist the United Kingdom in securing [a] dollar exchange,” and getting the 
“industries … back to full production as quickly as possible .. to secure dividends for 
their shareholders.”103 Yet, the onus was put on struggling laborers to understand the 
workings of economics and not the shareholders, who expected their dividends 
regardless of the state of poverty and destitution in post-war Malaya.
This was a crucial time for Indian laborers. They had understood the capitalist 
agenda. The war had also changed the way they perceived the colonial power. They had 
developed a spirit of defiance and were not afraid to confront the authorities with their 
demands. They took on a nature quite contrary to their perceived docile demeanor. This 
new  demeanor was surprising to planters and officials who were previously
accustomed to the patriarchal atmosphere of pre-war estates, [and] 
expected as a matter of routine to cope with the day to day problems of 
their laborers, financial and domestic, and who had difficulty in adjusting 
themselves to the post-war spirit of independence.104
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All Malayan Rubber Workers Council (AMRWC)
Amidst the numerous strikes organized by different groups, one in particular 
stood out. The August 25, 1947 Malayan wide strike organized by the  All Malayan 
Rubber Workers Council (AMRWC). This organization was a fairly young 
predominantly Indian trade union that was established on June 6, 1947. It was headed by 
S.V. K. Moorthi, the President of the Selangor Estate Workers Trade Union (SEWTU), an 
organization that represented 240 estates. Initially, its main task was to demand a 100% 
wage increase for Indian laborers. Had the demand been successful its concession would 
have applied throughout the Malayan Union.105 
The AMRWC came into being when meetings held between the United Planters 
Association of Malaya (UPAM)  and the Central Committee of the SEWTU collapsed. 
The UPAM was an organization representing mostly European planters.  The UPAM 
agreed to all of the SEWTU's demands except the 100% increase in wage rates for Indian 
estate workers.106 UPAM's denial of the 100% increase in wages for Indian laborers 
became the first cause that the AMRWC took up on its inception. Its second aim was to 
oppose the 20% cut in contract tapping rates imposed by the UPAM, which would have 
mainly affected the Chinese estate laborers. By combining these two causes, the 
AMRWC projected itself as an organization that cut across racial barriers and fought for 
the rights of all workers. Eventually, the AWRWC succeeded in forcing the hand of the 
UPAM to concede to the re-establishment of the 20% contract wage rates. 
By mobilizing all estate laborers to participate in a one day General Strike on the 
105 Labor Department, “Monthly Reports on Labor Conditions – June, 1947,” in Monthly Reports on Labor 
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25 of August, 1947, this young organization exerted pressure on the UPAM to concede to 
its demands. The agency of the Indian workers in particular comes out through this strike 
and although the effectiveness of the strike is eventually down played in the colonial 
documents, it is also some of  these documents that give important recognition to the 
beginning of agency among the Indian working class, and further, how it was only 
expected to grow.  
The dismissal of the Malayan Union by the British was empowering to 
organizations like the UPAM. While the failure of the proposed  Malayan Union 
constitution was a  tremendous blow to the working class in Malaya, it emboldened 
colonial sanctioned businesses. These businesses that owned plantations felt that they 
could dictate the conditions governing workers and the latter would have no choice but to 
adhere. The brazen behavior of the colonial power in completely dismissing the demands 
of the Chinese and Indians passed on to the planters as well. Planters took the opportunity 
to find ways to further reduce wages of workers. On June 7, 1947 planters denied the 
demands for a 100% increase in wage rates for all Indian estate workers. In the same 
month,  the  UPAM suggested that wages would have to be “reviewed because of the fall 
in the price of rubber” and recommended “a 20% wage cut be imposed on the tapping 
rates of contract workers.” 107
Trade unions affiliated with the strong communist influenced  Pan Malayan 
General Labor Union (PMGLU) however, were “convinced that the UPAM's decision 
was motivated less by the fall in the rubber price than the calculated attempt to reduce the 
107 Palanisamy Ramasamy, Plantation Labor, Unions, Capital, and the State in Peninsular Malaysia (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 76.
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wages of Chinese labor to the level of Indian labor.”108 This was a very real suspicion on 
the part of the trade unions as the Labor Report for June, 1947 when addressing this 20% 
wage cut in contract tapping rates by the UPAM admits,
... the paradoxical position of negotiations going on on the one hand, to 
consider a demand for a 100% increase in time work rates which would 
mainly affect Indian estate workers, while on the other employers were 
imposing a 20% cut in contract tapping rates, which would affect namely 
Chinese labor, therefore, opening UPAM up to accusations of using this 
retrograde method of narrowing the gap between Indian and Chinese 
earnings, instead of increasing the rates of pay to Indian laborers.109
Unions accused the UPAM of making this decision out of its own “selfish determination 
and self-preservation,”  while ignoring the plight of the workers who had to deal with the 
rising cost of living. In a letter written by The Union of Rubber Employees to the 
Malayan Union Secretariat in July, union leaders stated that even the “government 
authorities admitted that the standard of living for June had averagely become higher,” 
therefore making “the  wages earned by the workers prior to June ….  hardly .. enough to 
upkeep their living.”110  The letter further denounced the Government for avoiding any 
kind of involvement in settling the dispute between the workers and UPAM, stating that 
they were surprised and disappointed that the “Labor Commissioner [who has] the legal 
authority to settle labor disputes said that he has no power to do so.”111
The AMRWC, acting as a representative for all laborers, consistently wrote to the 
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UPAM and the Malayan Union Secretariat with its demands, warning that the matter 
could take a serious turn. At every juncture it assumed a more aggressive tone, unafraid 
of consequences and willing to challenge the UPAM. The Labor Department Report for 
July 1947 acknowledges that the AMRWC appealed to the Government “to discuss both 
the 20% cut and the former demand for a 100 % increase in time work wages,” 
threatening that “100,000 estate workers may be forced to take active steps to defend 
their interests.”112 It urged UPAM “to convene a round table conference of UPAM and 
AMRWC,” or otherwise, to jointly appeal “to the Malayan Union Government in calling 
for a Tripartite Conference (Representatives of Government, Employers and 
Employees) ... to carry out timely negotiations in settling the .... matters amicably.”113 
Another letter sent to the Governor of the Malayan Union indicated that the high costs of 
living incurred by the Indian workers was the main reason for demanding a 100% 
increase in wages. It stated that the increase in prices of essential commodities presented 
major problems to the Indian workers who could not afford these prices.
 As such, if no further steps were taken to solve these disputes amicably 
then undoubtedly Malayan-wide strikes, which are direct result of 
unbearable conditions of workers, would be unavoidable.114 
Further, on the issue of the 20% wage cut on contract labor, the union accused UPAM of 
“[threatening] defenseless workers with unemployment and [driving] them to the 
borderline of starvation,” if workers disputed this cut.115
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They questioned  its authority saying, “if you have not the authority for the 
formation of a machine of negotiation, then what machine do you have for the 
declaration?” The union pressed on, describing the UPAM as “a machine of contradiction 
and confusion.” 116 Receiving no positive response for negotiations from either the 
UPAM or the Malayan Union Secretariat, on August 22  the AMRWC declared they had 
no other option but to carry out their threats. In its second meeting, AMRWC members 
agreed to use “the only weapon in the armory ….. and call for a General Protest Strike on 
the 25 of August, 1947 for the duration of one day.”117
Breaking with the past Chinese workers supported the AWRWC, indicating a 
working-class solidarity. Previously the Chinese were always more  militant in their 
demands and the Indians less vocal. That pattern would change in the post-war period. 
Indians had also discovered their voice.  Although Michael Stenson acknowledges that 
“Indian laborers were more militant than Chinese throughout 1947,” he goes on to claim 
that Indians received little Chinese support and were “unwilling to strike in solidarity 
with the Indians when this would prejudice their own living standards.”118 This thesis 
proves otherwise. Colonial documents on labor from the National Archives in Kuala 
Lumpur show this solidarity. Before the war, each community functioned separately. 
However, both communities now realized that they had to stick together in order to stand 
up to colonial authority. This was an important development and something the colonial 
power had tried very hard to prevent all those years before. 
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After the one day strike on August 25, a letter sent from the all Chinese Batu 
Pahat District Rubber Workers Association to the Governor of the Malayan Union, said 
to represent the views of “2200 odd male and female laborers” under its jurisdiction, had 
this to say:
On the 25 of August, the laborers went on a one day strike as a protest 
against the UPAM, They have been forced to do so. The main point is the 
maladministration of the UPAM. The latter did not take into consideration 
of the livelihood of the laborers. In all Labor Dispute Negotiation 
meetings, the laborers have pointed out the inability of the laborers' to 
meet even the minimum cost of living. The UPAM did only look after 
their own pockets, and knew nothing of present day conditions. They 
should be held responsible for the strike. It is hoped that H.E. will 
earnestly comprehend the miseries of the laborers for the sake of the 
benefits of capital-labor co-operation, social peace, and the prosperity of 
Malaya, and urge the UPAM to expedite negotiation with the Malayan 
Rubber Workers Council, and to guarantee the livelihood of the laborers. 
We once more repeat that the protest against the unreasonable 20% wage 
reduction and support for the 100% increase in wages asked for by the 
Indian workers are rational.119
This letter clearly represented the views expressed by Chinese workers  regarding 
the UPAM's unfair decision on wages, but its main importance lies in the support it 
showed for the Indians.  The Indians and Chinese had developed a like minded attitude in 
supporting each other's cause.
On August 26, a day after the strike,  the Malayan Union Secretariat informed the 
AMRWC “that as a result of the unanimous advise of the Labor Advisory Board to His 
Excellency the Governor, a draft Wages Council Bill is being prepared.” This was with 
the intention of introducing “a democratic method of fixing wage levels which retain all 
the chief elements of collective bargaining yet has the advantage of requiring that the 
119 Batu Pahat District Rubber Workers' Association to H.E. The Governor of the Malayan Union, 29 
August, 1947. Letters. 1957/0623766, Malaysian National Archives, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
61
minimum rate fixed shall be enforced by law.” 120 Although this merely passed the buck 
on to the new Wages Council Bill, colonial officials acknowledged that the AMRWC' 
efforts worked. This acknowledgment was significant  in determining Indian agency. The 
colonial authorities felt the pressure from the AMRWC and the Indian laborers, leading 
them to write in the Labor Report for 1947: 
One thing seems very clear – given only a good cause – the 
organizers will be able to call out practically the whole industry 
pretty rapidly. Their control is more effective than was generally 
realized.121 
Once the effectiveness of trade unionism started to show itself, a decision was taken by 
colonial authorities to clamp down on it.
According to political scientist P. Ramasamy, the August 25 nation-wide strike 
was  effective in most parts of the country.  In some states it led to 90 – 95% closure of 
estates while in others, about 50 – 75% closure of estates.122 The  Labor Department's 
report on trade unionism released in September of that year estimated that the day's strike 
led to “a stoppage of approximately 70% of the European owned section of the 
industry.”123 
 Ramasamy also wrote that the AMRWC was successful in organizing strikes but  
unsuccessful in obtaining wage increases. However,  Labor Department reports from 
1947 reveal contrary information. These reports provide evidence that the 20% cut in 
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contract wages was overturned and wages were restored.  Although the AMRWC' efforts 
appear to have helped the Chinese only, information from the Labor Department also 
indicates that by this time, an increasing number of Indians were also engaged in contract 
work, and  benefited from this wage restoration. Indian laborers, struggling to make ends 
meet, increasingly wanted to be paid contract tapping rates like the Chinese laborers. The 
November labor report in 1947 noted, “.. the increasing tendency for estates to employ 
Indian tappers on contract rates.”124 The combined pressure from an increasing number of 
Indians and Chinese engaged in contract work, would have worried the UPAM and 
forced its hand into conceding. Even so, these concessions were given slowly and in parts 
as planters and colonial authorities attempted to maintain control over the situation.
The Labor Department report for November 1947 states that employers relented 
and offered an initial 5% restoration of wages early in the month of November. This was 
after indication from the UPAM that “there was a chance of the complete restoration of 
the 20% cut in contract tapping rates imposed in July.” The report goes on to say that 
laborers were disappointed when only a further 5% was restored in the middle of the 
month. This led the union to adopt “a smug attitude” and make “pointed remarks 
regarding the generosity of the employers.” However, employee-employer relations 
improved when “employers issued a notice on the 28th of the month that the full cut of 
20% would be restored as from the 1st of the month [November].”125 
Employers giving in to the union's demands in order to restore stability is evident 
in the  Labor Report for December 1947, where it is stated that “... the complete 
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restoration of the 20% cut in contract tapping rates which was granted in November had a 
steadying effect on labor.” 126 This was affirmed again in the Annual Report of the Labor 
Department for the year 1947 by R.G.D. Houghton, the Commissioner of Labor himself. 
Although his report downplays the significance of the August 25 strike and those other 
strikes, and gives the impression that labor was not at all unhappy and that in fact, “there 
was a definite improvement in employee-employer relations in spite of the reduction 
made,” he admits to the 20% wage restoration and credits it to the employers.127 His 
statement that “workers were impressed by the initiative which had been shown by the 
employers,” however, is clearly meant to diminish any role that a collective working 
force or the AMRWC played in obtaining that restoration.   
Here, the employers set the tone of the public transcript making themselves look 
good.  Anything positive had to appear as if it came from the benevolence of the colonial 
authorities  and not through the demands of the workers. The colonial authority attempted 
to control the narrative. At the same time though, they acknowledge the agency of Indian 
laborers. The colonial power now recognized that there was an awakening in the Indian 
laborer. The Tamil laborer was no longer passive. He was not going to blindly follow the 
dictates of those who ruled over him. He questioned those dictates and resisted if they 
were contrary to what he desired. This colonial recognition of  Indian agency comes 
through in the following labor report in September, 1947:
The Indian agricultural worker has been used to control by domination 
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from above. In India and prior to the war in Malaya, he was quite 
prepared to accept the dictates of the panchayat of his village or estate, 
despite the fact that he had no say in its election. It saved him the trouble 
of thinking for himself. It seems that his awakening and willingness to 
take responsibility will be slow in developing but there is no doubt that  
it is taking place.128
This recognition of the beginning of agency amongst a formerly docile and easily 
manipulated community put fear in the hearts of colonists. They were used to the 
militancy among Chinese workers but not the Indians. The race card always gave them 
the ability to  use the latter to keep the former in check.  The Dalley/Awberry Report on 
labor and trade unionism, commissioned by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 
1948 was clear in stating that the Indians outnumbered all races on the estates.129 This 
report was written with the intention of looking thoroughly at the situation of labor and 
trade unions in Malaya. Recommendations made in this report  were given the highest 
consideration by colonial authorities. If this report recognized Indians as a formidable 
force on the plantations, how could the colonial power then allow these laborers to 
become more aggressive in their demands?  Something needed to be done. 
The Indians' new militancy, albeit in its infancy, compounded by working-class 
racial unity, was going to be crippling to the colonial capitalist enterprise, and the British 
knew it. Hence, its harsh draconian response in suppressing the power and influence of 
“leftist” trade unions and declaring a period of Emergency in 1948, the very next year 
after the victory of the AMRWC and a collective racial working-class. 
128 Trade Unionism in Malaya, September 1947, in “Trade Unionism in Malaya,” Labor Department, 
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Singapore,” (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office)1948, DDA/7/7, in Frederick William Dalley
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By this, the display of agency by the Indians was  quickly subverted. It was a 
victory for the AMRWC and the Indians but the colonial power was not going to give 
them that recognition, which may have legitimized their position. The number of working 
days lost (see Table 1) illustrates the Indian workers' growing power. The statistics 
available for the month of August however would have been much higher had the labor 
report for that month taken into account the one day strike on August 25, but it was not 
included. According to the Labor Department accurate figures were not available.
Table 1 - The number of days lost to strikes on estates in Malaya for the second half of the 
year in 1947.130 
Month Number of Disputes Number of 
workmen involved 
in all stoppages in 
progress during 
the month
Aggregate number 
of working days 
lost in all stoppages 
in progress during 
the month
Jun 15 1712 13601
July 46 6538 63071
August 36 5520 72973
September 22 5969 70150
October 12 2927 12143
November 26 3318 18831
December 14 2019 25140
130 Monthly Reports on Labor Conditions – June - December, 1947, in Monthly Reports on Labor 
Conditions – Reports on Labor Strikes and Disputes, 1947. Reports. 1957/0291825, Malaysian National 
Archives, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
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Colonial Subversion of Indian Agency
When the British declared a state of emergency in Malaya in June 1948, they were 
projecting their dominance and authority by defining who was a terrorist and who was 
not. The Emergency period in Malaya was bloody and lasted until 1960, by far the 
longest state of emergency in any British colony. Left wing unions were denied 
registration. Leaders were arrested, even killed. More militant trade union leaders fled to 
the jungle to wage an armed struggle against the British. Colonial forces pursued and 
killed these militants. The declaration of the Emergency was an indication of  refusal on 
the part of the imperial power to recognize post-war struggles for  independence and 
freedom from the shackles of colonialism. Sociologist Frank Furedi defines this state of 
emergency as confusing times. He said that,
these conflicts were either actually or potentially colonial wars. The term 
emergency was essentially a public relations concept. It had the advantage 
of allowing Britain to adopt wide-ranging coercive powers while 
maintaining the pretense of normal civil rule. Above all, emergencies 
helped create the impression that the issue at stake was that of law and 
order rather than a political challenge to colonialism. An emergency was 
called to restore order – by definition it aimed to curb those who caused 
disorder. Emergency measures allowed colonial governors to label their 
opponents as law breakers. At a stroke anti-colonial activists could be 
transformed into criminals or terrorists.131
Conventional wisdom will say that a combination of factors such as the rise of left-
wing trade unionism, a destruction of civil order through trade union activity, and the 
involvement of the Malayan Communist Party in trade unions, was what led to the 
creation of the Emergency period. A better explanation will include the inability of the 
colonial power to control the working class.  No recognition is given to this because of 
131 Frank Furedi, Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism (London: I.B. Taurus, 1994), 
1.
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the way the public transcript has been presented by the colonial power. The masses had 
discovered their voice and their strength, not just within their own communities, but the 
strength of a combined racial unity.  The trade unions were just a means to carry our their 
purpose.  Just as the British industrial manufacturers saw “themselves as Hercules and the 
industrial workers who challenged their authority as the hydra,” so did the British 
colonizers in Malaya see themselves as a power that needed to destroy a combined force 
of peasantry that rose up to challenge their colonial interests.132 The Malayan working 
class struggle was a threat to British dominance.
As early as 1946, the UPAM was determined to curb left-wing unions. According 
to Michael Stenson, “The numerous strikes and labor agitations that year was simply 
interpreted as the work of agent provocateurs.” They suggested the following measures:
.. the non-recognition of the Federal Trade Unions, the application of the 
Secret Societies Ordinance to all unregistered groups, the banishment of 
subversive elements, strengthening of police power, the use of the 
military when necessary and the introduction of an arbitration 
mechanism.133 
Trade unionism was the bane of British interests and the MCP was blamed for 
using trade unions to get their agenda across.  The Emergency period was used to get rid 
of these “subversive elements”  and  replace them with compliant and conservative trade 
unions. In 1947,  the colonial authorities claimed that over 70% of trade unions in 
Malaya were under  the influence of political parties with a Communist agenda. The 
usually pliant Indian workers were seen as being taken advantage of by these Chinese 
132 Linebaugh and Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden 
History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, 4.
133 Michael R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University  Press, 1970), 156-157, quoted in Ramasamy, Plantation Labor, Unions,  
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communists, who as the British claimed
have been clever enough to see how useful the Indian, who is a British 
subject, can be for their purposes. They can use the Indian vernacular 
press to further their views in this country and in India, and with the 
advent of India's independence, they can make the old story of 
imperialism and its link with capitalism  seem more real and true than 
ever.134 
Imperial authorities could not believe that Indian workers wanted peace, justice, 
order, and decent wages. They could not understand that Indians might have felt 
empowered by India's nationalist struggles and their service in the Indian National Army 
and Indian Independence League, during the war years.  The British agreed that the 
nationalist movement in India had an effect on the Indian workers  but only in so far as 
raising a consciousness that “he was an Indian and that India was aiming at full 
independence and the exercise of sovereign rights.”135 Apart from that, the worker did not 
fully “understand” the struggle for freedom from colonial exploitation. This 
consciousness was however sufficient for workers to draw a parallel between colonial 
control and capitalism, and how Indian workers figured in this relationship.  They 
understood that their labor was being appropriated for the benefit of the empire. They 
understood that they were not going to gain anything but a continued life of misery, 
unless they fought back.  They connected this day-to-day through the humiliation and 
poverty they suffered in the hands of the colonial planters and administrators. They 
understood what it meant to be appropriated by a colonial regime for as Scott said:
Appropriation is ..... the purpose of domination. The very process of 
appropriation however, unavoidably entails systematic social relations of 
134 Trade Unionism in Malaya, September 1947, in “Trade Unionism in Malaya,” Labor Department, 
Malayan Union, September 1947. Report. 1998/0003858, Malaysian National Archives, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia.
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subordination that impose indignities of one kind or another on the weak. 
These indignities are the seedbed of the anger, indignation, frustration, 
and swallowed bile that nurtures the hidden transcript …. Resistance, 
then, originates not simply from material appropriation but from the 
pattern of personal humiliations that characterize that exploitation.136
It was this consciousness that moved Indian laborers to get involved in trade 
unions. It was a last resort on the part of the collective working class as the British 
refused to listen to their grievances. Only the MCP was willing to listen. Therefore, the 
working class consciously allowed the MCP influence over them.  For the colonial power 
to say that these external elements took advantage of the working class, or mere 
uneducated laborers, is again to say that these people had  no ability to think for 
themselves, therefore denying them any agency. They did have agency and they knew 
fully well the repercussions for exercising their rights. The Tribune political writer, S. 
Raja Ratnam, in his critique of the Dalley/Awbery Report said that communist influence 
on trade unions was inevitable as workers
receiving no sympathy from either the Government or the employers … 
turned to the Communists for leadership – and the Communists gave it. 
They acquired some reputation as the 'true' champions of the working 
class. The main purpose of the Communists was to embarrass the 
'imperialist-capitalist'  government. They did this by making impossible 
demands – 'impossible' from the point of view of the employers but not 
necessarily from the workers …. which made them [the Communists], 
appear as real champions of the workers.137  
The Dalley/Awbery Report commissioned by the colonial government was a way 
to whitewash the real problems in Malaya in the post-war period. It was of course, meant 
to set the path for conservative unionism and it succeeded in getting that done. S.S. 
136 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, 111.
137 S. Raja Ratnam, “Why the Unions Turn Towards Communism,” Tribune, 1948, U DDA/9/1, in 
Frederick William Dalley Papers, U/DDA, Hull University Archives, Hull History Center, Hull, United 
Kingdom.
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Awbery, Labour M.P. and also an official of the Transport and General Workers' Union, 
and F. W. Dalley, an ex-assistant general secretary of the Railway Clerks' Association 
spent eight weeks in Malaya beginning February 1948, with the purpose of looking 
thoroughly at the labor situation and trade unions in Malaya. Being appointed by the 
government, it was not surprising that they would have concluded their report by saying 
that the colonial government gave every effort and encouragement in the period after the 
war “for the exercise of freedoms of a democratic country – including freedom of speech, 
Press, and association, while preserving law and order.” Further, “..... that due regard was 
paid to the aspirations of the people of Malaya and the progressive policy of His 
Majesty's Government.” 
With regard to trade unions, the report stated that, “Particular encouragement was 
given  to the formation of responsible democratic Trade Unions, and as a special help in 
this connection a Trade Union Adviser's Department was established,” but that the MCP 
“... however continued with their post-war plans” by setting up “'cells,' dubbed Trade 
Unions, for every type of trade and worker – from miners and rubber workers to cabaret 
girls. None of these was in the smallest degree representative or democratic.”138 The 
conservative press in the United Kingdom when writing on the Dalley/Awbery report, 
chose to highlight facts such as those above.139
Communist influenced press and propaganda however chose to focus on the labor 
struggles mentioned in the report. On the causes of the Malayan people's upsurge against 
138 S.S. Awbery and F.W. Dalley, “Labor and Trade Union Organisation in the Federation of Malaya and
     Singapore,” (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office,1948), U DDA/7/7, in Frederick William Dalley
     Papers, U/DDA, Hull University Archives, Hull History Center, Hull, United Kingdom.
139 “Communists in Malaya: Influence in the Trade Unions,” Scotsman, 4 November 1948, U DDA/9/1, in 
Frederick William Dalley Papers, U/DDA, Hull University Archives, Hull History Center, Hull, United 
Kingdom.
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imperial rule, the report blamed high prices of essentials and low wages, and 
recommended how industrial grievances should be handled.  The Daily Worker 
countered,“Although their report makes admission of the appalling conditions in Malaya, 
they do their best to whitewash the Government's terror campaign against the people.”140
The crux of the matter was that the report neglected to focus on the workers' 
economic rights. Indeed Communists had a stronghold on the trade unions  because they 
were providing leadership to the workers, and encouraged them to voice their grievances. 
The workers wanted democratic leadership and they were being deprived of it by the 
government and the planters, who much preferred the pre-war paternalistic way of doing 
things. The Standard in an article on July 10, 1948 summarized it well by saying that
the paternalistic system, however gratifying it may be for the ego of an 
employer, is today considered an affront to his ego by the worker who is 
moved by a new sense of his dignity. The worker is no longer content to 
depend on the generosity of his employer. He thinks in terms of 
economic rights.141 
The article continued to say that employee-employer conflict was necessary, and 
unavoidable, “but well organized trade unions and employers' associations are effective 
guarantees that such a conflict does not descend into the anarchy of class war.” However, 
this was precisely what was happening in Malaya at this time. Entrenching the Indian 
working class in their menial tasks and not allowing them true democratic representation 
was to ensure a destruction of their future and those of their children. Eventually, with no 
real  union to support and protect their interests, they lost their 'agricultural stronghold.' 
Coming into power at independence, the Malayan government that was propped up by 
140 “Appalling Facts in Malaya Report,”Daily Worker, 4 November 1948, U DDA/9/1, in Frederick William 
Dalley Papers, U/DDA, Hull University Archives, Hull History Center, Hull, United Kingdom.
141  “A Necessary Evil,” Standard, 10 July, 1948, U DDA/9/1 in Frederick William Dalley Papers, U/DDA,
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the British, continued the policies of the British, and neglected these Indian laborers, 
leaving them to a worse state of destitution.
In his well written critique of the Awbery/Dalley Report, journalist S. Raja 
Ratnam,  aptly pointed out some of the more salient points that the report seemed to have 
missed. Labor struggles in Malaya was in a setting of colonial rule, something that the 
authors overlooked. It was not in a free, democratic, developed nation such as Britain. 
Where labor had taken a long time to establish itself and create a unionism with a 
democratic flavor, Malayan workers were trying to do in a few years while contending 
with a legacy of colonial culture. That they achieved what they did was something to be 
applauded, albeit under communist influence. The fact remained though, that if the 
colonial government had given them the proper recognition and means to establish truly 
democratic unionism, communist subversion may have been prevented.  
The authors description of the workers also largely treats them as  migrants. The 
grave error of the British when abandoning the Malayan Union constitution is repeated 
here. The political, social and economic climate was no longer the same as when Indians 
were brought to Malaya by the British, or when the Chinese came as free laborers. In the 
minds of the British, this was still a country with a people under colonial rule. In the 
minds of the working class, the terms had changed. These were people who had already 
decided to make Malaya their home. They wanted more than a mere wage. They wanted 
a future. If the basic things that they were demanding were not being addressed, then 
what hope was there for a better future?  As S. Raja Ratnam reflected,
The labor problem must be studied in a situation which is a continual 
flux – a situation burdened with a heavy heritage of past neglect and 
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unresolved grievances. The labor situation must not be described as 
though it is divorced from the economic, social, and political 
environment …. [Authors have failed to appreciate] the way in which 
Malaya's labor problems influence and are influenced by the 
environment in which they operate.142
The important thing about colonial rule in Malaya was that it failed to prepare the 
Malayan people for a future that was good, especially the former migrant races. Of the 
two migrant races, the Indians would be the ones worse off. The short term capitalist 
interests were always foremost in the minds of the British planters and officials. The 
colonial power knew that it would not be able to control the colony for much longer as 
costs mounted in maintaining its hold in Malaya and fighting the “reds,” so the focus was 
to get as much out of Malaya as it could. Concentrating labor in the extraction of 
resources ensured the under development of the country. Charles Gamba, an economist in 
the 1950s, wrote: 
The fact that virtually the entire production of raw materials is exported 
offers an indication that the industrial development of the country is 
relatively low. Furthermore, the high degree of dependency on rubber, tin, 
and coconut – as exports – exposes Malaya to violent fluctuations in 
external demand and prices; fluctuations almost entirely outside Malaya's 
control and having the severest repercussions on the national income and, 
thus, on the labor body – wages and salary earners – of the country.143
Gamba complained that Government was not interested in a more effective 
control over the economic life of the colony, giving preference instead to the interests of 
rubber and tin groups. He foresaw this being a problem for the almost 500,000 rubber 
and tin workers once production levels started depleting or being replaced  by other 
142  S. Raja Ratnam, “The Guides Who Took The Wrong Turn,” Tribune, 1948, U DDA/9/1 in Frederick 
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products. At that time, the United States had reported a new processing method for the 
production of synthetic rubber at much lower costs, a process Gamba envisioned being 
taken up by other countries. It did eventually happen and it was the Indian laborers that 
bore the brunt of it as they lost their traditional source of livelihood. 
A further subversion of Indian agency came in the form of an amalgamation of 
unions under the umbrella of a conservation trade union called NUPW. Its leader, P.P. 
Narayanan, was  a rather unknown person among the larger Indian laboring community, 
but one that caught the eye of John Brazier, the Trade Union Adviser of Malaya as a 
potential British ally. Ramasamy has written extensively on the formation of the National 
Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW).144 Until the introduction of the Emergency, 
Brazier had little success in the promotion of unions rivaling the left-wing ones. Despite 
the government machinery on his side, he was not able to influence the mass-based trade 
unions organized under the Pan Malayan General Labor Unions (PMGLU).  It was then 
that he turned to little known leaders such as Narayanan.  According to Ramasamy, “It 
was on Narayanan that he placed much hope in providing the much needed leadership for 
the development of alternative unions in the plantation sector.”145 The British recognized 
in him someone who would put their policies into place. On November 2, 1954, the 
National Union of Plantation Workers was officially formed. It was anointed by the 
British High Commissioner, who declared, “By my presence I want you to know how 
welcome is [sic] this important step you have taken.”146 That its membership was largely 
Indian is indicative of the colonial way of maintaining dominance through segregation. 
144 Ramasamy, Plantation Labor, Unions, Capital, and the State in Peninsular Malaysia.
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The working-class racial unity that developed after the war was effectively broken down. 
Gamba noted that “the NUPW leadership was content for its members to remain largely 
Indian in order to retain hegemony and because it was administratively convenient, even 
though the exclusiveness may have been at the expense of its bargaining power.”147 In the 
end the Emergency period of “police and military repression, strict censorship of news 
and information, [and] the powers of arbitrary arrest and detention, gave impetus to 
conservative political and trade union organizations,” one of them being the NUPW.148 
With the creation of the NUPW, the hopes of the Indian agricultural workers to 
have a better life, was crushed. Agency was taken away from them, and they remained an 
exploitable laboring class, with very few being able to free themselves  from the horrible 
cycle of poverty and destitution.  Colonial dealings in Malaya ensured that the Indian 
labor community would remain a permanent labor diaspora. However, an alternate 
memory of them as being a people who struggled against the colonial power  and  who 
achieved some victory; and a people who exercised their agency, even if it was for a brief 
time, should exist. It inspires the community to believe in themselves and not always 
think in terms of how others negatively perceive them. It gives a glimmer of hope to the 
youth in the community to know that a long time ago, their forefathers did fight to make 
their lives better.
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis with the recognition that a modern spirit was 
displayed by Indian Tamils after World War II. In their resistance to colonial rule, Indians 
147 Charles Gamba, The Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya (Eastern Universities Press: Singapore, 
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showed a defiant nature quite contrary to the colonial perception of them. Radical 
unionism was a display of agency as Indians attempted to change the course of their lives 
by taking on the British through strikes, the strongest weapon in their hands.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Schmidt and Patterson in their introduction to Making Alternate Histories, 
observed that “the erasure of local histories,” was the main reason why it was important 
to have a different perspective of history, as opposed to the accepted historical narrative 
presented by those in power.149  An alternate perspective reveals how dominant forces 
manipulate facts in order to present a picture that is only acceptable to them, and a picture 
that presents them in good light. Their research provided “several insights on how 
colonial and neo-colonial powers manipulate the production of histories, encouraging 
certain forms of history while discouraging and even silencing others.”150 This thesis, like 
the work presented in Schmidt and Patterson, gives an alternate perspective on how the 
Indian  labor struggles after World War II  should be viewed. These struggles were  a 
display of agency and the start of modernity, something the state-sanctioned historical 
narrative completely neglects because of the transition from colonialism to 
neocolonialism that Malaya went through.  As Patterson and Schmidt explain,
Whereas colonialism is the expression of power relations between 
dominant metropolitan countries in the West and the politically, 
economically, and culturally subordinated peoples on their margins, 
neocolonialism is based on economic and cultural subordination in the 
era after colonized peoples gained political independence. 151 
The true account of Indian labor struggles has been hidden, giving an impression 
149 Peter R. Schmidt and Thomas C. Patterson, “Introduction: From Constructing to Making Alternative 
Histories,” in Making Alternative Histories: The Practice of Archeology and History in Non-Western  
Settings, ed. Peter R. Schmidt and Thomas C. Patterson (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 
1995), 4. 
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78
of a community that has always been inferior to the Malays and Chinese, one that never 
stood up for anything, and one that's not able to succeed in life because it was lazy and 
quite content with the little that it had. Such a view over time allowed for the continued 
repression and manipulation of these people. Linguistics scholar Shanthini Pillai argues 
that it is the subaltern nature of the Indian coming as an untouchable to Malaya to 
perform menial work under imperial bidding, and as such seen as being only able to fill 
insignificant roles, that has shaped the perception of Malayan Indians. She asserts that 
they were subalterns, 
... manipulated by the imperialists in their bid to secure a labor force, and 
relentlessly accentuated in colonial discursive articulations of their 
presence in Malaya; vestiges of its garb still cloak contemporary 
Malaysia's perception of them.152
Pillai eloquently argues that this subaltern nature was never a given in the lives of 
the Indians, since there were many moments in which they tried to break from the 
shackles of colonialism through acts of insurgency. Yet, the present work shows that there 
was a point in Malaya's history when these Indians went beyond acts of insurgency and 
confronted the colonial power, placing themselves on an equal platform. They were no 
longer interested in deserting the plantation life or settling for the  little advances that 
came their way.  They wanted more. They wanted citizenship and rights. They wanted 
fair wages and better living conditions. These rights they were willing to fight for and 
they were willing to do it in collaboration with the other races. The imperatives of  the 
concept of unity within a plural society was not lost on them. It was only through unity 
152 Shanthini Pillai, “Unpacking Imperial Crates of Subalternity: The Indian Immigrant Labourer of 
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that they could stand up to the British. It was only by supporting each others' demands 
that they could possibly gain anything from the colonial power.  The effect of World War 
II  therefore was to strip the Indian coolie of his subaltern nature and awaken in him a 
character that was no longer willing to be subservient to the colonial power.  Historian 
Michael Morgan writes:
 For the Indian worker in particular the war years were to be a baptism 
in politics. He above all had been mystified by the paternalistic curtain 
behind which the British exploited his cheap labor. Once it had been torn 
down it was  to prove extremely difficult to draw again.153
The Beginning of a Modern Spirit
Modernity in the Malayan Indian context was therefore that moment in history 
when these Indian peasants decided to think decolonially.  Walter Mignolo in his 
criticism on Western notions of modernity said that, “the darker side or hidden agenda of 
modernity was coloniality.”154 Colonialism in Malaya was to throw people back into a 
pre-modern state. For the Indian peasantry, this was especially true. These were a people 
who had embarked on a journey that took them away from their villages decades before, 
where they lived under an oppressive caste system, only to find that their new 
environment was not that dissimilar.  In this new order, the Brahmins were in fact the 
British, and they, the Tamils, remained a dispossessed community.  In his discussion on 
decolonial thinking, Mignolo stresses that it is important to not reject the colonial past 
but rather to embrace it and re-imagine the society that one lives in. To think this way 
153 Michael Morgan, “The Rise and Fall of Malayan Trade Unionism, 1945-1950,” in Malaya: The Making 
of a Neo-Colony, ed. Malcolm Caldwell and Mohammed Amin (London: Spokesman, 1977), 150-198.
154 Walter Mignolo,  The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options (Durham: 
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requires “changing the rules of the game rather than the content.”155 I assert that this was 
the consciousness of the Indians in Malaya after the war. They could finally imagine a 
better future for themselves, but they also realized that it was not going to happen without 
a fight. Partha Chatterjee in The Nation and its Fragments, raised an important 
observation of peasant consciousness in Colonial India which resonates with Mignolo's 
decoloniality.  He wrote that while nationalists tried to mobilize the peasantry into an anti 
colonial force, the peasantry chose to “make sense of it not in terms of the discursive 
forms of modern bourgeois politics but rather by translating it into their own codes,” 
undergoing therefore “a quite radical transformation of meaning in the peasant domain of 
politics.”156 Because Chatterjee was making an observation of a situation during colonial 
occupation in India, it could be said that these peasants were already thinking 
decolonially, and therefore being modern. 
Similarly, the Malayan Indian laborers understood the ramifications of supporting 
trade unions heavily influenced by communism. The All Malayan Rubber Workers 
Council was in fact a communist creation. It gave voice to Indian workers grievances and 
was a space in which they could make their stand. It was a justified cause given the 
misery they were in. Aligning themselves with the Malayan Communist Party was a 
calculated move. It was peasant politics being played out at a time when Western powers 
were seeking to keep people in Asia under continued suppression. 
Historian Barbara Watson Andaya contests the idea that all things “modern” 
originated in Europe. She argues the need for broadening this idea of modernity in 
155 Ibid., 92.
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Southeast Asia in order to find “evidence of a modern spirit in earlier times.”157 The 
emergence of a predominantly Indian trade union in the form of the AMRWC that stood 
in support of both the Indian and Chinese working class, bridging the gap between old 
cultural differences in a time when the world had witnessed a challenge to Western 
dominance and hegemony, was in keeping with this 'modern spirit.' Naturally, criticisms 
towards this trade union movement such as that by an Indian lawyer as quoted below, 
would not have found favor with the AMRWC or any trade union movement in the 
period concerned.
The present leaders of some of the trade unions lack the experience 
which leaders in England and America have. The systems in England and 
America have been developed 'gradually' and slowly from broad 
precedent to precedent, and their machinery and the system under which 
the machinery functions have been developed after a lapse of hundred 
years at least. The leaders of some trade unions in Malaya are trying to 
do overnight what the English and American trade unions are doing now. 
They are ignorant imitators.158
Criticisms such as this from those within the echelons of the colonial structure 
implied that Malayans needed to be taught trade unionism by the West.  This sort of 
thinking was as Dipesh Chakrabarthy argued,  in line with the “first in the West, then all 
else,” type of reasoning, giving credence only to those ideas coming out from the West.159 
The Malayan working class was not  waiting to be taught, rather they were going to 
define the workings of unionism themselves. In its subversion of the trade union 
movement, the British eventually proved that there was nothing modern about their brand 
157 Barbara Watson Andaya, “Historicising 'Modernity ' in Southeast Asia,” Journal of the Economic and 
Social history of the Orient 40, no. 4 (1997): 391-409.
158 Monthly Report on Labor Conditions – August, 1947, in  Monthly Reports on Labor Conditions – 
Reports on Labor Strikes and Disputes, 1947. Reports. 957/0291825, Malaysian National Archives, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
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of trade unionism.  It was a unionism that protected colonial interests and destroyed true 
worker representation. It was repressive in nature and ensured the marginalization of the 
Indian working class. This repression of colonial peoples was perhaps the Western notion 
of modernity that the British was propagating throughout its colonies. However, over 
time the colonial peoples appropriated this notion of modernity for themselves and began 
to redefine it from their vantage point as is indicative of the Malayan Indian labor 
struggles post World War II.
Ranajit Guha in his book Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial  
India, recognized the peasant as being a modern person, insisting that “instead of being 
an anachronism in a modernizing colonial world, the peasant was a real contemporary of 
colonialism,  a fundamental part of the modernity that colonial rule brought to India.”160 
He stressed that theirs was not a “backward consciousness” but a consciousness that took 
into account the political and economic institutions before them. They knew and 
understood the power relations of their time.  Peasant insurgency in India, Guha wrote, 
was a political struggle.161 Similarly, the struggle of  the  Malayan Indian laborers after 
the war should also be seen in the same light. These were a people who had partaken in 
the colonial notion of “modernity,” thereby making them into a modern citizenry. They 
no longer lived in the confines of a village that boxed them into subaltern roles. They 
were free having discarded those chains generations before. They had the Japanese 
invasion and the war to thank for stripping the colonial power of its veil of dominance. 
All these experiences created a new consciousness in the Indian Tamil. A modern 
160 Ibid., 13.
161 Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Durham: Duke University 
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political consciousness that led to a political struggle.
Colonial documents however, were not going to paint the truth. Rather, these 
sources were going to present all that happened post-World War II as a destruction of 
civil order by diabolical forces that used the Indian and Chinese working class as pawns. 
Morgan, writing on trade unionism after the war said that those interested in the history 
of the Malayan working class had, “unfortunately to rely primarily on sources and 
accounts largely hostile to the politics of the labor movement during the period under 
consideration.” 162 This was not surprising given the need  by the elite or the dominant 
power to monopolize the public discourse.  What was actually happening was a 
contradiction to what the colonial power wanted to project of itself. As Scott said, “If a 
'people's democracy' claims to exist to promote the interest of the working class, it cannot 
easily explain why it is breaking strikes and jailing proletarians.”163 
This was what colonialism did to Asia. It created muted voices in history, while 
overwhelming it with a strong dominant narrative. The British never intended Malayans 
to be free.  It viewed racial unity in Malaya with pessimism. A pessimistic view was easy 
to adopt when the British themselves knew how hard they had worked at and succeeded 
in fomenting racial divisions in Malaya. The colonial power doubted the Malayan 
peoples ability to bridge cultural differences and create a successful plural society 
because they knew that the divisions were deep and would require extraordinary effort 
from all the races to overcome. For their purposes, it was better to dissuade ideas of unity 
and focus on the improbabilities of a racially united society. British intent after the war 
162 Michael Morgan, “The Rise and Fall of Malayan Trade Unionism, 1945-1950,” in Malaya: The Making 
of a Neo-Colony, ed. Malcolm Caldwell and Mohammed Amin (London: Spokesman, 1977), 150-198.
163 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, 54-55.
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was the “creation of new Dominions, self-Governing but part of the Commonwealth 
owing allegiance to the Crown.” They decided that Malaya was not ready for true self-
governance and that the policy  regarding self-governance in plural societies such as 
these should be “the expression [and] not the instrument of unity.” They placed a 
paternalistic tone on the creation of a Malayan nation by convincing themselves that the 
Malayan people still needed and wanted British rule. The following quote by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies clearly shows this:
These fears [of communal violence] haunt the various races; none of them 
in their heart of hearts wish to see us go. They still believe in British 
justice. We must not break down their belief … All know that we are their 
hope and stand-by. I say therefore, that we must persist. I believe that with 
patience and wisdom there is a reasonable chance – if we are given the 
time – of reaching our goal, a united Malayan nation within the British 
Commonwealth and Empire.164
Statements like this gave the impression that the Malayan people themselves were 
not convinced that there could be racial unity and therefore needed the colonial power to 
act as an overseer and arbitrator. In truth, the colonial power was not ready to part from 
its cash cow. It needed to stay as long as it could to milk the country of its resources. That 
it could only do with the domination of Malaya's working class. It was certainly not 
going to allow Malayans to experience their own version of modernity. Demands for self-
governance, self-organization, and an end to exploitation were all appalling thoughts to 
the imperial power.  Rediker and Linebaugh wrote that self-organization was a threat to 
the ruling class, whose sole concern was the manipulation and exploitation of cheap 
labor.165  Similarly, the Malayan peoples' demand for independence and self-governance 
164 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet, “Malaya,” 21 December 
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was a threat to the imperialists. 
Bassey W. Andah wrote that the practice of archeology in Africa needed to be 
rewritten if it was to yield “inside” history and “an authentic African biography such that 
the ordinary African is enabled to rediscover a true historical self (individual, social, and 
cultural) and thus a sense of history and creativity.”166 Similarly, a different approach 
needs to be taken in the study of history in Malaysia. History as Malaysians know it, 
needs to be rewritten in order to strip it of its colonial and neo colonial traits. This 
process of stripping away is especially beneficial to the Indian community, as a 
marginalized race in Malaysia. It is empowering for such a community to know the truth. 
It is important that such a community should know that it was involved in a project for 
modernity and self-independence years before as it is empowering knowledge,  if nothing 
else came out of it. For their own personal empowerment, a different version of history as 
opposed to the usual narrative is necessary in motivating them to strive for a better life. It 
presents them a picture contrary to one which maintains them as a subaltern community.
Looking for Evidence of Modernity
In his analysis of the different approaches taken by scholars on the subject of 
modernity, historian Frederick Cooper concluded that it was important to not just focus 
on the Euro-centric notion of modernity but take into account the debate and struggles 
that emerged out of the spaces where this was contested.  He said: 
The struggles were unequal, but they were not one-sided. Colonial voices 
might have to shout to be heard in European capitals, but at critical 
moments, the intensity of colonial conflicts, uncertainties about colonial 
166  Bassey W. Andah, “Studying African Societies in Cultural Context,” in  Making Alternative Histories:  
The Practice of Archeology and History in Non-Western Settings, ed. Peter R. Schmidt and Thomas C. 
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policies, disagreements between those who wanted to save souls and 
those who wanted exploit bodies, and competing visions of national 
missions and national interests provided fissures that colonized subjects, 
….. were able to pry open.167 
Cooper's encouragement to listen to what was being said about modernity in the 
world is a useful approach in trying to locate modernity in any situation. In the Malayan 
context, the struggle put up by the Indian and Chinese working class post World War II 
exposed the colonial power's selfish motives. Labor struggles exposed the colonial 
power's idea of wanting to create a society that was acceptable to its own notion of what 
was right. The Malayan people as a whole wanted something better after the war. To 
“listen” as Cooper said, to the voices emerging out of the war, was to recognize this 
desire. Self-governance, independence, better jobs and higher wages, were all cries for a 
life free of colonial rule. In a situation where such voices were muted, it is difficult to 
obtain evidence  that voices such as these ever existed, however, evidence of these voices 
can be found.
People were not afraid to speak boldly, one of the first indications that they were 
ready to embrace modernity. The language against the colonial power was 
confrontational and no longer docile. Ramasamy, writing on the influence of the All 
Malayan Rubber Workers Council, quotes a trade union leader saying the following while 
addressing estate workers in 1947:
Workers, the Manager is afraid of the Labour Union in as much as to say 
that the Union will instill into your head to demand better wages and 
better living conditions. Look at your houses, what are they? Mere 
replicas of pig-stys? Workers, why must you suffer so. This world is not 
for the capitalists, who number a mere fraction against countless hoards 
167 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Ewing: University of 
California Press, 2005), 149.
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of workers.168
Slogans written in Chinese reading,”Fellow workers! Let us use the strength of 
united action to smash the UPAM's entry [sic] for wage cut and retrenchment of 
employees;” “Hold firmly to the demand of Indian workers for a 100 percent increase for 
wages,” and, “Support with determination the call of the All Malaya Workers United 
Committee,” were of special significance.169  These slogans were of importance because 
they were written in Chinese for Chinese but in support of the Indians, indicating a 
working class solidarity – another marker for modernity. While colonial rule created and 
encouraged divisions, this new consciousness amongst the working class was striving for 
unity. This show of solidarity was quite contrary to the Colonial Secretary's statement 
that the Malayan people had “fears of communal violence.”170
Another instance is seen in a letter to the British newspaper Daily Herald on 
March 29, 1950 from H.B. Lim, the editor of the Malayan Monitor, in response to an 
editorial written by the Daily Herald regarding the Malayan revolt. It condemned the 
newspaper for its biased reporting of the situation in Malaya. The letter stated that the 
editorial attacked the “Malayan Liberation movement as 'murder, arson and terrorism,'” 
therefore giving the impression that the revolt in Malaya, did not exist. The letter urged 
the British public to consider why such a show of military force was necessary if the 
problem in Malaya was merely one of 'murder, arson, and terrorism.' Its claim that the 
“heavy concentration of British army, navy and air force [had] after 22 months, signally 
168 Ramasamy, Plantation Labor, Unions, Capital, and the State in Peninsular Malaysia, 77.
169 Ming Sheng Pau, 1 September 1947, quoted in Ramasamy, Plantation Labor, Unions, Capital, and the  
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failed to quell the 'murder, arson and terrorism,'” raised the question if there was more to 
this picture.  This show of force during the Emergency, it claimed, of some 120,000 
British, Gurka, and Special Constabulary signified that, “.. the British forces must 
indubitably be up against something far more widespread and far more rooted in the 
people of the country, than mere 'murder, arson and terrorism.'” Using Cooper's approach 
in “listening” to what was being said about modernity, this letter is then significant as it 
claims that what was actually happening in Malaya was a people's revolution or 
movement, and it was a movement under siege. It was one that was being wrongly 
represented to the British people. H.B. Lim asserted:
The facts are plain. The Malayan people are fighting to be free. They 
have no wish to kill for the sake of killing; but it is Britain’s imperialist 
policy which demands that they should be put down with force. Every 
freedom loving and peaceful people opposes such a policy. Not to do so 
would be a total surrender to slavery, and the perpetuation of the crime 
of exploitation of one people by another.171
Yet another instance is found in a letter written  to Frederick William Dalley, one 
of the co-authors of the Dalley-Awberry Report,  by a former Assistant Trade Union 
Adviser whose employment was terminated. When locals within the colonial structure 
recognized the problems about colonial rule and became vocal about  these problems, 
they were dismissed. Colonial rule did not tolerate subversion. When that subversion 
came from those who were singled out to assist the colonial power, it was not tolerated. 
M.S. Dhoss was terminated on the suspicion that he was sympathetic to the workers' 
grievances. He wrote this letter with the intention of pointing out all the problems he 
171 H.B. Lim to Daily Herald, March 29, 1950, Papers on Communist Party of Malaya, Information on 
Malayan Independence Struggle and the Malayan National Strike, 1946-1947. CP/CENT/INT/36/08 
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recognized as being detrimental to the relationship between workers and the colonial 
power.  As someone who worked closely with the workers he could point out succinctly 
what was being demanded by the workers and what were their grievances. What stands 
out in his letter is his denouncement of the Labor Department. He wrote that, “.. [the] 
department which is supposed to look after the interests of the worker has not fully 
appreciated the worker as human and hence the gulf between them is growing.” His letter 
pointed out that the lack of understanding between the central authority and the workers 
was the main cause of distrust. The colonial power did not truly appreciate the problems 
workers were facing. With the standard of living higher than before the war, daily wages 
were inadequate to make ends meet. Workers wanted better wages. They wanted 
employers to listen to their problems. They wanted adult education in order to find better 
jobs. None of these were of concern to the colonial power who was solely interested in 
getting the machinery of capitalism running again. Dhoss wrote that the harsh Emergency 
regulations were curtailing personal freedom and,“when and if this is denied, democracy 
becomes a farce.” Dhoss also argued that his termination was unfair and illegal, 
stating,“British justice is something that anybody should be proud of for it is built on the 
assumption that a man is innocent till he is proven guilty.” Dhoss accused the British of 
“high-handed” action saying that he was sure this would not have happened if he were a 
European.172 
Those whom the British had set apart to “run” Malayan affairs were increasingly 
becoming critical of colonial ways. Another instance in which we  “listen” to this voice 
for change is in an article written by Ooi Thiam Siew, Secretary to the Penang Division 
172 M.S. Dhoss to Frederick William Dalley, 15 August 1950, U DDA/11/5, in  Frederick William Dalley 
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of the Malayan Trade Union Council. Ooi gained recognition among the British as 
someone who would make a good trade union leader. As such, he was sent to Britain to 
learn about the workings of trade unionism under the tutelage of known union leaders. 
However, Ooi developed his own opinions and criticisms about the situation in Malaya, 
writing to authorities regarding all the appalling conditions he saw. He was especially 
concerned about the rubber plantation workers as he believed that they were the 
“backbone of  … the working class movement in this country.” He said, 
It is tragic that employing interests and Government are not acutely aware 
of the need to satisfy the human needs of the tappers. It would be a real 
calamity for this country if we were to value the tapper more for his 
output than for his human personality. Such mistaken ideas of human 
values in this democratic era are – in the words of the General Secretary 
of the Malayan Trade Union Council - “a subsidy for communism.”173
Ooi argued that the workers only wanted  “a fair wage for their toil,” and that the 
employers “had not proved that the rubber industry could not pay what the workers asked 
for.”  Bringing up testimonies held before the Whitton Arbitration Tribunal and Justice 
Taylor, Ooi pointed out that the planters were “holding back facts of production costs 
from impartial arbitrators,” thereby showing “a lack of faith by employers in negotiations 
and arbitration,” and “making a mockery of democratic institutions and procedure.” On 
the other hand, Ooi said that “unions leaders .. gave conclusive evidence on both 
occasions that efficient estates could well afford to pay the rates asked for by the unions 
and still pay dividends to shareholders, even if the price of rubber went down to fifty 
cents per pound.”174 Ooi was in fact challenging the colonial authorities and accusing 
173 Ooi Thiam Siew, “Malayan Workers and the Trade Unions,” 4 November 1948, U DDA/11/9, in 
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them of exploitation, a dangerous road to take as it would embolden the working class to 
stand up for their rights. In trying to make his case of exploitation even stronger, Ooi 
quotes Richard Deverall, an American Trade Unionist who met with planters when he 
visited Malaya in 1950 under the aegis of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions' Mission:
Many of the plantations pay their stockholders annual dividends of 25 
per cent, 50 per cent and up to 150 per cent! Contrasting this against the 
mud huts and the degraded lives of the working people, one appreciates 
the exploitation of the Asian plantation economy.175
When the mission asked the planters the number of vacation days the rubber tappers were 
allowed, the planters replied, “Well, we allow them three days free time per year!” When 
pressed further by Deverall if the tappers had Sundays off, the reply was, “Well, they can 
have it if they want, but they are so anxious to make money and they like their work so 
much that we just can't keep them from working.”176 Revealing these facts, Ooi in his 
position as a trade unionist was breaking away from the colonial power's notion of what 
unionists would stand for. He was not going to be a stooge of the British. In speaking this 
kind of language, leaders like Ooi were in a good position to mobilize the already 
discontented workers into fighting the colonial power. His use of language was of vital 
importance as he said that  the workers “right to live” was more than just an ideal. “It is a 
fundamental human right. It means that all workers must be paid a living wage. While it 
is debatable what should constitute a living wage, here in Malaya, it is not difficult to 
assess what should be the minimum required to keep a worker and his family from 
starving.” He saw the arguments put up by employers such as, “We cannot pay them,” 
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
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and,  “If they want such wages, we have to close down our business,” as nothing more 
than mere excuses.  He said,
Such excuses by employers are not valid when wages paid to workmen 
are not even sufficient for mere subsistence. It is inhuman. To all who 
believe that this is not so, I will quote the words of Mr Frank Walsh: 
“The industry which cannot pay a living wage has no right to exist. It is 
profiteering in human blood and tears.” Therefore, I appeal to all workers 
in Malaya – Keep up the struggle for your right to live. Fight a clean 
democratic fight. With unity and the will to win, you can achieve a better 
life for yourselves and your families.
That last invocation was especially important when considering modernity.  It was a call 
to not accept things as they were but to resist and strive for something better. Ooi was 
pointing out that the system as it stood, was not a democracy, but, as Dhoss also pointed 
out, a “farce.” In encouraging a spirit of resistance and urging the workers to put up a 
democratic fight, Ooi was asking them to take on a modern consciousness – a significant 
marker of modernity.
Mobilization, according to Ranajit Guha, was divided into two categories. In the 
“domain of elite politics mobilization was achieved vertically whereas that in the domain 
of subaltern politics was achieved horizontally.” While the former was more “cautious 
and controlled,” the latter was “more spontaneous.” Subaltern politics in India involved 
those who came together through an organization of “kinship and territoriality or on class 
association.”177 While in India this popular mobilization “was realized in its most 
comprehensive form in peasant uprisings,” in Malaya it took the form of labor strikes and 
organized revolts under the influence of the MCP.  It was a mobilization of the working 
class that cut across the boundaries of race. It was a struggle against imperialist 
177 Ranajit Guha, “On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India,” in Selected Subaltern  
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exploitation, thus the beginning of modernity in Malaya. On the part of the British, it was 
the need to repress this insurgency so rubber revenues would not be affected which led to 
draconian Emergency regulations and the increase in British forces in Malaya. As the 
Malayan Monitor reported, 
The rubber imperialists are therefore, making hay while the sinking sun 
still shines a little, and are at the same time howling for more British 
troops to be sent to stem the tide of defeat. More blood for more profits is 
an appropriate slogan for the financial manipulators of British and 
Malayan lives.178
Present Day Indian Struggles in Malaysia
November 25, 2007 was a significant day for the Malaysian Indian Tamil 
community. 20,000 people gathered in an unprecedented show of protest towards the 
Government of Malaysia.  They marched  to the British Embassy in Kuala Lumpur to 
deliver a 100, 000 signature memorandum to the Queen of England. The memorandum 
urged the Queen to help this Indian community by appointing a  Queen's Counsel to 
represent them in a legal case against the British Government. It claimed that actions of 
the former colonizer abandoned them to harsh discriminatory policies that ensured the 
continued marginalization of Indians and their future generations through the unfair 
practices of the Malaysian Government. 
The said legal case was a class action suit filed by P. Waytha Moorthy, a lawyer 
representing the Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF), for USD 4 trillion.  The suit 
that was filed on August 31, 2007, incidentally the 50th anniversary of Malaysia's 
178 “The War and Rubber Profit,” Malayan Monitor,  April 1950, Papers on Communist Party of Malaya, 
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independence, specifically stated that it was seeking damages from the British 
government  for “150 years of exploitation.”179 HINDRAF's legal adviser, Uthayakumar 
Ponnusamy said that, “The British brought us here, exploited us for 150 years and left us 
to the mercy of a Malay Muslim government. They should compensate us now.”180 The 
march to the British High Commission was prevented by the police who had  refused to 
grant a permit for the rally. Roadblocks were set up to screen motorists entering the city 
center with the purpose of identifying trouble makers. Members of the public were urged 
to stay away from the rally. Foreign media, like Al Jazeera, documented the excessive use 
of force by the police in the form of tear gas and water canons. Although the 
memorandum was never delivered that day, HINDRAF claimed to have faxed it to the 
British High Commission. The High Commissioner, Boyd McCleary, issued a statement 
on November 28, 2007 saying that the Commission had been prepared to accept the 
petition  but it was never delivered.  On the HINDRAF claim that the memorandum was 
faxed, the Commissioner said that some information was received but declined to 
elaborate on its nature. 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, then Prime Minister warned that the government would 
invoke the Internal Security Act (ISA) against the demonstrators if needed. The ISA was 
a legacy of the British which was first introduced under the Emergency Regulations 
Ordinance of 1948 as  “preventive detention.” When the Emergency ended in 1960, the 
ordinance was repealed and the government passed the Internal Security Act  under the 
authority of Article 149 of the Malaysian Constitution. The ISA has been criticized 
179 Baradan Kuppusamy, “Facing Malaysia's Racial Issues,” Time, November 26, 2007, 
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repeatedly by both international and domestic human rights organizations including 
Human Rights Watch, the Malaysian Bar Council, and the Malaysian Human Rights 
Commission on grounds that it violates fundamental international standards.181 The 
Malaysian Human Rights Commission or SUHAKAM is however limited in the amount 
of pressure it can exert as it is an organization established by the Malaysian Parliament 
under the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999, Act 597, and therefore 
under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Department. The ISA allows for the 
detention of any person the police deems as a threat for up to 60 days, a period in which 
legal counsel is denied. As long as there is, “a suspicion that an individual has acted or is 
about to act or is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia  or 
any part  thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic 
life thereof,” that individual can be arrested under the ISA. Because the use of the Act has 
been repeatedly criticized by human rights groups and members of the public, the 
Malaysian government under Prime Minister Najib Razak announced that it would be 
replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012. This new Act was passed 
by the Parliament and given the royal assent on 18 June 2012. However it has yet to 
come into force and is still awaiting an announcement by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Two days before the HINDRAF rally, three lawyers including Waytha Moorthy 
were arrested for allegedly making seditious remarks but were subsequently released 
when the prosecution could not provide the trial judge with the necessary evidence. On 
the 26 of November, Waytha Moorthy was released. He left Malaysia  before the ISA 
could be invoked on him. He was granted amnesty by the British Government and lived 
181 “Malaysia: ISA Detainees Beaten and Humiliated,” accessed November 28, 2012, 
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in London till this year. While in London, his Malaysian passport was revoked and he 
was given special documents by the United Nations to travel on. His main efforts while 
in exile included rallying support for HINDRAF and the Malaysian Indian cause around 
the world. 
The significance of the HINDRAF led rally was the fact that it garnered the 
support of the other races in Malaysia. Having brought their grievances to the forefront, 
Indians drew the  support of the Chinese and the Malays in the country and this was 
manifested in the outcome of the 12th Malaysian general elections of 2008. The ruling 
UMNO led government lost its two thirds majority in Parliament simply because of the 
swing in Indian votes and those that supported HINDRAF. The racial solidarity is 
reminiscent of the unity shown after the war. It made a significant impact then and here 
again. The 13th Malaysian general elections is set to take place by the end of this year. It 
will be interesting to see if the homecoming of Waytha Moorthy will have an influence 
on the Indian Tamil community and if  this will impact the next elections.
The fact that such an event  as the HINDRAF rally took place in the 21st century 
is of great historical significance. It supports the idea behind this thesis that a colonial 
subversion indeed happened. Like  the group's claim, this thesis also states that  the 
British were responsible for the suffering of this former labor diaspora.  Indian Tamils 
were denied agency after World War II and that denial of agency had serious 
consequences. As a minority race, the community was thrown into the backwaters. All 
opportunity for upward mobility was destroyed and they were pushed to the fringes of 
society where they and their progeny would suffer poverty and destitution. Vestiges of 
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colonialism still cling on them like ugly rags.  They seem to have remained, untouchables 
from those remote South Indian villages, who were crammed unto steamers and brought 
to Malayan ports to work on coolie lines all over the country so very long ago. 
Susan Johnson spoke of the power of memory and remembering. She hoped that 
alternate memories, rather than historical memories would separate difference from 
domination.182 Alternate memories lend a voice to modern day struggles. Instead of 
looking at the period after the war as a time in history when people lost out to 
domination, perhaps inspiration can be drawn from the fight that was put up and the show 
of agency. The present generation of Indian youth can draw hope and strength from an 
alternate historical perspective of their forefathers. Perhaps the march organized on 
November 25, 2007 signifies another moment for change in the lives of this former labor 
diaspora. It's history in the making and certainly one to be watched carefully.
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